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Estação “Stockwell” em Londres, confundido 
com um terrorista, mais uma vítima inocente da 
violência arbitrária estatal. 
I dedicate this master's thesis to the memory of the 
deceased fellow countryman Jean Charles de 
Menezes, killed on July 22, 2005, at Stockwell 
Station in London, mistaken for a terrorist, another 




















Only the dead will know the end of the war – 
Plato 
Even in this day and age war is sometimes 
justified, but “this truth” must coexist with 
another – that no matter how justified, war 
promises human tragedy. The soldier's courage 
and sacrifice is full of glory … But war itself is 
never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as 
such. So part of our challenge is reconciling 
these two seemingly irreconcilable truths – that 
war is sometimes necessary, and war at some 
level is an expression of human folly-  US 
President Barack Hussein Obama (Nobel 
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“Geronimo, E.K.I.A-(enemy killed in action)”, these words marked the end of 
Osama Bin Laden. A non-identified member of the top-elite/secretive team of the 
“United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group” (also: DEVGRU/Navy-
SEALs/team SIX), in the village of Abbottabad in Pakistan, had gunned down the 
headman of Al-Qaida for good and the precious information was instantly conveyed 
back to the White House Situation Room, where President Obama was gathered with 
senior officials.  
Contrary to what was originally thought, “Geronimo” was not the nickname for 
the terrorist leader; in fact, this word, in military parlance, commonly refers to “G”, the 
seventh letter and seventh stage of the military operation carried out on 2nd, May, 2011, 
which involved the killing or capture of the main target. The secret alias of Bin Laden 
was “Crankshaft” and the whole mission was baptized rather “Neptune Spear 
Operation”1.  
The outcome of the operation did not startle the world. The likelihood of a Bin 
Laden detainee was instinctively low. As for a simple tactical challenge: what to do 
with Bin Laden alive? However, the perspective of a dead Bin Laden does not damp the 
symbolism, theories of conspiracy, call for jihad and revenge either, not even does it 
vanquish completely the infamous group he belonged to. The fact that he was deprived 
of his life, nevertheless, raises some questions over necessity, proportionality, thus, the 
lawfulness of this specific, though not unusual, tactic of current counterterrorism, if 
assessed through the lens of international law as it stands.  
Piecing together art.3-UDHR, art.6(1)-ICCPR and art.4(1)-ACHR, it becomes 
evident that the right to life inherently appertains everyone, without exception, and it 
shall be respected and protected by law, imposing that no one be deprived arbitrarily of 
this paramount attribute. The key legal element lies precisely on how to interpret the 
meaning of arbitrary, inasmuch as the non-arbitrary deprivation is, in principle, 
admissible.  Additionally, it shall become clear throughout this legal opinion that the 





right to life, anyway, is far from being absolute. It is not anytime that the domestic 
criminal law-enforcement paradigm is operational.  
The ICJ has asserted in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that "(t)he test 
of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life…falls to be determined by the applicable lex 
specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict(…)”(§25). It is not to say that 
peacetime provisions are completely superseded by “warlike” commandments: both 
frameworks complement each other (CCPR/General Comment.31,(§11)) and during 
hostilities there is still room for humanitarian considerations. The regulatory regime of 
interstate resort to force also has an impact on the human right to life, particularly 
considering the onset threat of non-states actors. 
As a premise, in despite of the US traditional position that the expressions 
“within its territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction” of art.2(1)-ICCPR should be 
interpreted cumulatively to limit the scope of application of the international obligation 
to respect and ensure the rights set forth without discrimination, human rights apply 
extraterritorially in cases where State agents exert sufficient control, illegal or not, such 
as through the use of firearms, over individuals. The fact that they act abroad does not 
mend a serious violation.  
The present opinion is built upon 10 intuitive topics relating to three relevant 




















2.1. Kill to arrest 
 
“Osama Bin Laden was killed in a firefight”2, through these words, President 
Obama implied, possibly, that the death of the terrorist leader came about as a result of 
the latter resistance to an attempt of arrest made by the Navy-SEALS, as they broke into 
Bin Laden’s lair. Nevertheless, in the rush to provide details of the successful raid in 
Abbottabad, the critical information of whether Bin Laden shot back was actually 
wrong: he was unarmed3.  
Press Secretary Carney backed from the first data provided, confirming, though, 
that a gunfight erupted, indeed, inside the compound, but Bin Laden was not directly in 
its midst4. According to sources from the media, the SEALs were only once shot at, by 
the trusted courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who fired from behind the door of the 
guesthouse and was immediately killed5. The elite troop identified him through the wall 
with help of night-goggles6, before the special commando made further foray into the 
main house. How could then Al-Qaeda’s headman have resisted, so as to justifying his 
killing?  
The truth is the tactical group had no idea what Bin Laden’s minions had in store 
for them inside the housing-complex. In regards to the hideout of the most wanted man 
on Earth, all caution was, in principle, called for. Abrar Ahmed, the courier’s brother, 
also a resident, based in some sources appeared holding an AK-47 gun on the paved 
patio of the front entrance7, even if he had not had time to use it. He was mortally 
wounded, alongside his wife caught in the crossfire standing beside him8. Explosive 
devices or weapons of any kind could have been concealed in the rooms the SEALs had 
to clear before going up the three-storey main building9.  
As the special commando made their way up, other people plunged at them, such 
as Bin Laden’s youngest son, 19-year-old Khalil, slain at the staircase10, just as they 












came across scores of children and women, who were collected and restrained with 
plastic “flexi-cuffs”, for their own sake11. It would have astonished all personnel 
involved in the operation if Bin Laden had just let himself fall readily into the hands of 
his sworn enemy. For a man whose ideology of life consisted in praising martyrdom, 
some resistance was to be reckoned with. Indeed, Bin Laden possessed two weapons at 
arm’s reach, an AK-47 and a Makarov hand-gun12, though they were only discovered as 
the SEALs ransacked his room for valuable information13.   
Likewise, it would have been an arguable ground for killing him in case he had 
attempted to escape. Something that intrigued most investigators, nonetheless, was the 
total absence of underground tunnels, bunkers, fake walls/doors14 in the place Bin 
Laden holed up for at least 5 years. For a man such wary about his security – the place 
had no phone or internet connection15 - it seems odd to choose a place to be so easily 
corralled!  
The UN/Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, even if not a binding instrument, represent the consecration of 
desirable international standards to be implemented by nations across the globe16. The 
following excerpts shed some light in which situations the death of an individual is not 
considered arbitrary: 
5.Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law 
enforcement officials shall:  
(a)Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the 
seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved;[…] 
 
9.Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons 
except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of 
death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious 
crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a 
danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only 
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any 
event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life.(emphasis added). 
 
 
The paragraphs above offer some clues to fathom the necessity and 
proportionality criteria. Starting with the latter, solely in a few scenarios, two 
presented before – attempt of arrest/prevention of escape – and two that will be 
                                                          





16 Melzer,Targeted Killing..,p.200. 
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discussed in the next topic – self-defence/prevention of a serious offence –, the use of 
firearms (including: lethal force), is commensurate and justifiable, i.e. proportional to 
the objectives sought: the avoidance of a particular imminent and actual threat to life.  
Granted that the implementation of the non-conventional (customary) right to 
life probably considers acceptable to kill in order to overcome the resistance of Bin 
Laden to the lawful17 attempt of arrest based in the commission of violent felonies and 
even crimes against humanity – and considering that the risk of the supreme Al-Qaeda 
chief evading capture was minimal - was is really still necessary to bring an end to his 
life? The necessity prong imposes that the unwanted result arises from the 
unavoidability to save, otherwise, other lives, and the insufficiency of using less 
extreme measures, according to §9 of the UN/Basic Principles.  
The principal mark of a human rights informed paradigm is that it makes no 
distinction based on statuses of persons, thereby not classifying individuals nor 
warranting wanton discrimination18. If a person is deprived of her right to life in a 
concrete situation, it arises from blameworthiness/culpability, i.e., an exclusive conduct-
based approach19. In that manner, as the exhaustion of lesser life-endangering measures 
of crime-repression failed, lethal force may be utilized20.  However, I consider arrest to 
be rather a means (non-lethal force) to enforce the law, not the end in itself. It is 
certainly preferable to detain someone instead of killing. Arrest caters the general 
societal interests, by preventing the materialization of an actual danger21. At the same 
time, this measure also serves the interest of the legal order by bringing someone to 
trial, uncovering the truth and imposing a penalty in retribution22. Clearly, it is 
nonsensical to kill in order to arrest, simply because the police cannot arrest a corpse, 
only take custody of it. Death, the opposite fallout of arresting someone, represents the 
total frustration of the legal process in the criminal sense23. As O’Connell marked, the 
“fleeing felon doctrine” that authorized killing to effect the arrest even of a person not 
presenting any danger at all was harshly criticized in Tennessee v. Garner, which ended 
up rebutting Tennessee’s then legal statute24.  
                                                          
17 Eventual encroachment of sovereignty: see(3.3);There was an arrest warrant at a district court in 
NY.(News9). 
18 UCIHL,Expert Meeting…,pp.17,35. 
19 Statman,“Targeted….”,pp.181,191;also:Kretzmer,Targeted….,pp.181,190 
20 Kretzmer,id.,pp.178-179. 
21 Kremnizer,Use of Lethal…,p.80 
22 Id. 
23 Id.,pp.81,83 
24 O’Connell,Kill or Capture,pp.327. 
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Practically, the price of a non-dangerous someone’s escape is lower to the legal 
order and general societal values than liquidating him. As Osama Bin Laden did not fit 
the standard of “non-dangerous person”, the allowance to his death befits better when 
considering the threat/danger he transpired at the moment, not in order to exclusively 
arrest him. Not to mention that his killing annihilated most part of information that 
could have otherwise been obtained through a legal process.  
Moreover, pursuant to the standards summarized in the UN/Basic Principles, 
governments and control agencies should equip law-enforcement officials with a broad 
range of different types of weapons and ammunition that render it possible to exhaust 
non-lethal incapacitating measures before resorting to the inevitable tragic outcome(§2). 
Beyond that, officers must receive proper training concerning appropriateness and 
efficiency of alternative non-lethal measures(§19), whereas their agencies and 
commanders ought to foster issues of “police ethics” and “human rights”(§20)25. It is 
unwise to jump to the foregone conclusion that the elite troop of the SEALs, the 
maverick “team-SIX” was not trained/equipped in effecting an arrest, even a toilsome 
and risky one as that of Osama Bin Laden.    
Thus, regard should be had to the overarching values in which the conventional 
and customary right to life is assumed to rely. For instance, the complete wording of §9-
UN/Basic Principles sets forth that is justifiable to use firearms to arrest a person 
presenting “such a danger”(highlighted), which refers to imminent violence and threat 
to life. Therefore, it is obvious that the justification to kill someone in confront with 
law-enforcement agencies does not derive from resistance per se – arrest alone, as a 
matter of policy, cannot be a sufficient reason - but rather from the cumulative danger 
the affected person exhibits. 
  
2.2 Kill to prevent threat/crime  
  
Imminent26, actual and grievous threat to life/limb27 mainly directed at innocent 
bystanders constitutes a proportional ground to authorize the incapacitation of the 
                                                          
25 These precautionary measures are further explained by Melzer (Targeted…,p.198); See:(AI), “Guns 
and Policing”,pp.18-21. 
26 Kremnitzer argues that as for de lex lata of most countries a future threat will suffice as well, though I 
recognize the risk of it being too far-fetching or even arbitrary, due to a pure guessing exercise of dubious 
foresight (id,pp.73,75,79)  
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dangerous aggressor, which in most circumstances to be effective requires 
overwhelming force with death as an inevitable/instant consequence28 in order to utterly 
quench the impending peril.  
Handbook cases, such as that of “ticking bomb” scenario, in which an explosive 
ordnance is about to be detonated by a suicide-bomber, or of the hostage-taker 
menacing helpless ones with death if his demands remain unheeded, illustrate well the 
extreme situation calling for a final rescue shot29. This is also the most usual 
interpretation of §9-UN/Basic Principles. Indeed, the resort to force in accordance with 
art.2(2)(a)ECHR-“in defense of any person from unlawful violence”- does not 
contradict the right to life. Despite not applicable to the countries involved in this legal 
opinion – US and Pakistan – it is still an important source of comparative interpretation 
displaying the current state of customary law. Besides, as Melzer put it, the prohibition 
of “intentional killing” conveyed by art.2(1)ECHR is synonymous to the “arbitrary 
killing” of the remaining international instruments30, namely: art.6(ICCPR), 
art.4(ACHR),art.4(AfCHPR). 
The right to life contains, at the bare minimum, a negative to duty imposable to 
all (erga omnes obligation), especially law-enforcement officials, to simply abstain 
from taking it. For the sake of effective observance, public agents must protect lives 
(positive duty) that are being flagrantly menaced.  In consonance to those principles, it 
is not question of whether an aggressor forfeits his right to life while engaged in the 
unlawful behavior, merely, at that point, involving serious violence against life/limb, the 
duty of respect and protection of his right is suspended31, meaning that it becomes legal 
to repel the ongoing violence, even by means that renders death very likely. Or, in other 
words, through his guilt the attacker loses “moral parity” with his victim(s)32. Due to 
the conscious and deliberate choice that he has made to resort to unlawful violence 
against others, the demise of the offender is preferable to, or less regrettable than, that of 
innocent bystanders33.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 Some authors contend about whether threat to limb or other forms of violence upon the physical 
integrity, such as battery or rape, allow the use of lethal counter-action to stifle it (Wicks,Right to 









Moreover, the use of the sentence “(…)to prevent the perpetration of a 
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life(…)”[§9,UN/Basic Principles] 
should more properly be understood as coupling and further explaining the “defence of 
self or others” exception to the arbitrary taking of a human life rather than creating a 
discrete ground. It comes to mind intuitively that (self)defence against an urging and 
serious threat, translated into death and maiming, prevents the commission of an offense 
universally criminalized (murder, physical assault and battery) and, conversely, the 
prevention of a particularly serious crime is executed in form of (self)defence against an 
imminent threat of death or injury.  
All things considered, two practical questions remain unsettled: - Exactly which 
kind of danger or threat did Bin Laden pose? – Bearing in mind that it is proportional to 
apply deadly force upon a person displaying such danger or threat, was it, in this 
particular case, really necessary to proceed in doing so?  
Much of the same explanation to how the supreme headman of Al-Qaeda 
resisted the arrest could be repeated at this point. At the heated epilogue of the 10 years-
long manhunt everything could go wrong. The Special Forces, composed by the Navy-
SEALs/DEVGRU, on the ground, and the DELTA-Forces, waiting, on board of the 
heavy-lift Chinooks, from some distance34, did not have entirely foresight of the 
operation. The first attempt to descend stealthily from the Black Hawks copters onto the 
roof of the three-storey building almost presaged a disaster: one of the aircrafts had to 
crash-land in the patio35, probably affording whoever was protecting the terrorist leader 
inside the compound, plenty of time to prepare a stronghold. Instead of confronting Bin 
Laden in flesh and blood right away, the team had to level down three walls36 and, 
additionally, climb their way up the lair, floor by floor, of one of the most dangerous 
men recent history has witnessed.  
Withal, Bin Laden made use of a common tactic among terrorists of 
commingling with innocent civilians/relatives; hence, putting them deliberately in 
harm’s way. At the same time, through this unfortunate gathering of innocent women 
and children, the task of the commando became even harder to accomplish without 
miscalculations. As seen above, although he did not timely procure, he had access to 
                                                          
34 News4. 
35 News4. 
36 News10.  
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two weapons in his bedroom, including a heavy machine-gun37. While the SEALs were 
climbing up the stairs, it is presumed that Bin Laden, judging by the bearded man that 
appeared at the cross-hairs of night-goggles, peeped out for a moment when he was shot 
at, then to duck back into the room38. This could have given sufficient time to ambush 
the troops or put on a bomb-vest.  
Melzer propounded a tripartite assessment of necessity as encompassing 
qualitative, quantitative and temporal aspects39. The former represents what is 
considered to be the main criteria of defining necessity itself: the quality of force 
capable of incapacitating the target by inflicting fatal wounds as strictly unavoidable in 
order to protect life40. The middle criteria should not be mistaken with proportionality: 
once the lethal force is proportional and qualitatively necessary, no more force, in 
quantity, than absolutely necessary is to be applied41. Finally, it does not pass muster if 
the person does not yet or no longer present a justifiable danger or threat42. Bearing in 
mind that not solely a real threat, but a reasonable putative threat as well, as long as held 
in good faith43, especially in strained scenarios, can give rise to the necessity to kill. 
After all, as they entered the final room of the compound, the SEALs had to make split-
second decisions of whether to apprehend Bin Laden, while ensuring the safety of 
everyone involved therein, or to aim at vital organs and pull the trigger. Everybody 
knew that the likelihood of the latter alternative was higher, regard had to all the 
pressing circumstances.  
Some voices might reason that well trained troops such as the Special Forces in 
charge should have been ready to accept a higher risk level, including the possibility of 
violent death on duty, to accomplish maximal strategic/tactical success. Through a 
moral lens, there is absolutely no logic at all in yielding part of the upper hand of 
breaking into the complex, by surprise, to Bin Laden and his faithful followers. Law-
enforcement officials are not required to favour violent aggressors in detriment of their 
own lives. There is no such duty. It might have jeopardized the whole mission of 
capturing, alternatively, killing Bin Laden. Conversely, even in the operational law 
applied to the conduct of full-blown hostilities, which embraces more havoc as matter 
                                                          
37 News6. 





43 As decided in ECtHR-“McCann vs. UK” that the ground-troops believed the terrorists in the car 
presented a real danger, despite not being armed(§200). 
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of fact, there is not a duty of risk acceptance in order to increase protection for the 
(unlawful)combatant one is engaging. Yet, it only refers to assume more risk to own 
troops if so decreases “collateral-damage” to innocent civilians44. The agents have all 
right to self-defence45, on the same footing as the defence of others, against the danger 
Bin Laden posed. Apart from a sum of individual “rights” of self-defence of every 
single member of the Special Forces, arising from domestic criminal law, the Unity, as 
an administrative collective endowed as the State’s manu militari, also had a right of 
self-defence, a tactical-level right, derived from the most comprehensible and strategic 
right of national self-defence46. 
Instead of acknowledging that the mission was more prone to killing, given the 
extremely risky circumstances and all stakes involved, by pointing out that the sole 
purpose of the operation was to kill Bin Laden, no matter what, raises indeed concerns 
over the legality47. Officially, at least, the SEALs were prepared to arrest him in case the 
balance of the operation favored it48. To sum up, missions the only purpose of which is 
to kill, to wit, proper targeted killings, are incompatible with “human rights”-based law-
enforcement. If such a violent path is to be chosen, minimally, all the details about the 
target and the actual danger he poses have to be thoroughly analyzed, so as to avoid 
lamentable outcomes of innocents being mistakenly killed based in “shoot-to-kill” 
policies49. In regards to Bin Laden, however, everything appeared to have been double-
checked.   
 
2.3 Extra-judicial execution? 
 
On the night of 1st May-2011(US-time zone), President Obama, through a 
televised speech from the White House’s East Room, addressed the United States and 
the world with a clear message:“Justice has been done”50, as in clear conviction of the 
righteousness of slaying the terrorist leader. These words were carefully chosen to reach 
the decade-long demand for some form of forceful response from “those families who 
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have lost loved ones to al-Qaeda’s terror”51, and, apparently, from everyone that 
directly or indirectly had been affected by the tragic events which smeared that 
September cloud-free morning sky in Manhattan. 
Understandable as they are, the cries of joy of the cheering crowd that eagerly 
encircled the White House gardens in the waiting of a public confirmation, the 
celebration of a death, even of someone as Bin Laden that showed little mercy upon his 
victims, provoked some disquiet in other places around the globe52. The fact is, besides 
former Cuban president Fidel Castro53 and the Hamas-run administration of Gaza 
Strip54, the feeling of general relief was almost universal and no country publicly 
criticized/condemned the operation that led to the death of Bin Laden, including 
European countries55 that previously displayed some mistrust/hesitance of backing up 
particular US military adventures, such as the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses.  
Amnesty International-(AI), the reputable human rights nongovernmental 
organization seemed to have spared some of the fierce critiques uttered in the past. To 
wit, AI classified the targeted killing of the Al-Qaeda high operative in the Arabian 
Peninsula, Al-Harithi56, in 2002, by a “hellfire”-missile launched from an unmanned 
“Predator”-drone, the first case wide acknowledged by the US counter-terrorist 
campaign57, as an extra-judicial execution58. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh 
portrayed it as a “summary execution”59 and so did the UN/Special Rapporteur for 
Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions60. At this time, senior Director of AI 
adopted a milder tone only asking for further information from US and Pakistani 
authorities in order to clarify whether Bin Laden really resisted arrest, though unarmed, 
and whether stronger efforts were made to capture him61.  
UN/General Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, welcomed the death of Bin Laden as a 
“watershed moment” in the fight against global terrorism62. On the other hand, Kenneth 
Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch-(HRW) responded the statement the 
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UN/General Secretary, that the international community “needs more facts” and, in the 
way the operation was executed wanting credible “mortal threat” posed by Bin Laden, 
the latter was denied due process63. Additionally, two other Special Rapporteurs fell 
short of lambasting the Bin Laden killing, though both underscored the need for a due 
attempt to capture rather than kill, as well as that usually terrorists should be dealt with 
as criminals “through legal processes of arrest, trial and judicially decided 
punishment64. Besides, it is important to put all the answers on the table for public 
scrutiny, since the use of deadly force sets the pattern upon which the right to life will 
be interpreted and applied henceforth65.  
All the same, Obama’s choice of words must not be used as a precedent to 
consider “terrorists” as outlaws that can be slain anytime, anywhere, stripped off of the 
protections flowing from the conventional and customary right to life. The life of 
alleged criminals and terrorists has the same ethical value as that of anybody else66. 
Within the law-enforcement the mortal force constitutes an unexpected (and, must say, 
undesired) outcome of an operation that, forcefully, aims for other “loftier” goals, such 
as capture and neutralization67. The death of an individual under such circumstances 
neither stems from punitive (past-driven) nor deterrent (future-driven) purposes, it 
rather derives from the urgent need to deploy strictly necessary defensive force, as the 
veritable meaning of “ultima ratio”(last resort) option denotes. Violation of the 
straightforward constraints on the use of deadly force is tantamount to the application of 
an immediate death penalty by agents that act outside the spectrum of judicial review.  
Using Wittes’ play on words: prior to asserting any “due process”, one must ask 
which process is actually due in a given case68.  Unlike the right to life, most of due 
process rights are subject to derogation clauses in times of public emergency 
(art.4,ICCPR)6970, albeit with very limited material and temporal scopes of restriction71, 
and of course not discriminatory with regards only to certain people.  Putting it patently, 




66 Wicks,The right to life…,pp.128-129. 
67 Melzer,Targeted…,p.239. 
68 Wittes, What Process is Due?(OpinioJurisBlog). 
69 ECHR [art. 15(2)] admits derogation due to lawful acts of war, never declared in practice, probably 
because the application of humanitarian law is automatic (UCIHL,Expert Meeting…, p.13). 
70 International humanitarian law offers actually higher protection “due process rights” than human rights 
law. After capture, no derogation will be allowed to prisoners-of-war(art.4,GCIII); those with clear status, 
“unlawful combatants” will receive at a minimum the combined application of common art.3/art.75. API. 
71 Duffy, The “war on terror”…,pp.292-297;also:Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of…,pp.79-105. 
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perforce of derogation, law-enforcement officials enjoy freer hand to arrest people with, 
concomitantly, fewer options to challenge the power of “incommunicado”-detention. 
However, the right to life, as highlighted by CCPR/General Comment.6(§1) and 
UN/Basic Principles(§8), does not warrant the same limitations, even in times 
threatening the security of the nation, which would have justified curtailment of other 
rights.  
Inasmuch as the ontological preponderance of the right to life renders all rights 
dependent on the existence and fruition of life, an extrajudicial execution, i.e., the use of 
arbitrary mortal force in contravention of the narrowly defined permissible possibilities, 
ipso facto, violates all the rights that person was entitled to, including “due process 
rights”. Nevertheless, the correlative converse does not hold true: a violation of due 
process rights does not entail necessarily an arbitrary deprivation of life, unless the 
person also gets killed as consequence. Therefore, a duty to investigate the (suspicious) 
deaths of people in the hands of public agents accrues as an international obligation of 
the State, for the sake of transparency and democracy. Rusinova propounds that this 
duty transpires from art.6(1)-ICCPR(“protection of the law”) and CCPR/General 
Comment.31(§§15,18)72; I could also add General Comment.6(§4). Furthermore, as 
States must ensure respect for human rights (art.2,ICCPR), a thorough and impartial 
investigation of deaths disperses the climate of impunity and permits that State agencies 
learn from past mistakes73.  The duty to scrutinize publicly the legality of the killing by 
State forces was also pronounced by the ECtHR74. Accordingly, the US government 
should maintain the maximum extent of openness in ascertaining the multiple questions 
arising out of human rights NGOs and other voices of civil society.  
Finally, Professor Mary O’Connell, well-known vehement critic of the US-led 
drone campaign in Pakistan, expressed “relief” for the death of Bin Laden75. Besides, 
she congratulated the Obama administration for having “come to senses” in adopting 
the peacetime law-enforcement paradigm in the Neptune Spear, while rejecting 
wholesale the “war on terror” paradigm76. With all due respect to the eminent 
international law pundit, the sole application of human rights law, as discussed, offers 
only shaky grounds for the justification of Bin Laden’s killing. This is precisely why 
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many laypeople dismiss right away the operation as another example of American 
imperialism and total disregard to international law, without even glancing upon the 
more adequate ad bellum and in bello paradigms.  
 
3. “JUS AD BELLUM” 
 
3.1. Occurrence of an armed attack 
 
 Historically, until the early 20th-Century there was nearly no compunction to go 
to war77, though there were some incipient rules on how to wage war78, once the 
tensions had already burst in open conflict. As Clausewitz’ famously proclaimed “war 
is the continuation of politics by other means”. Violent, bellicose means, one must say. 
Shattered peace time negations were the usher of the war trumpets, when the stronger 
side could compel, in a form of unbridled self-help, its will upon the inferior opponent.  
At least, previously, in the middle ages there existed some Christian-inspired institutes, 
such as Truce/Peace-of-God, intended to sparing some vulnerable people and sacred 
land from violence and limiting destruction among knights during holy days79. The 
chivalry that constrained recourse to war was later replaced by the 17th-century Grotian 
“just-war” theory imposing that there existed a just-cause to seek (legitimate defence, 
compensation/reparation of wrongdoings, punishment of offenders through reprisals), a 
competent authority to permit the warlike path and a (subjective) right intention aimed 
at the prevalence of good over evil80. In other words, the aggressor party, bearing the 
moral guilt, would have to endure greater loss of life and property, which conversely 
would condone the greater permissibility to wreak havoc by the counterpart waging a 
just-war.  
In the dawn of last century, the nationalist mentality embedded in whim/pride 
led to the WWI. It followed attempts to limit resort to inter-State military force: a) the 
1919/League of Nations’ Covenant which made the right to go to war contingent on 
                                                          
77 Martin, Going Medieval,pp.5-6. 
78 First Geneva Convention(1864) and the Hague Conventions(1899 /1907). 
79 Encyclopedia Online Britannica(http://www.britannica.com/) 
80 Raines,“Osama, Augustine…”,pp.224-226. 
15 
 
ineffective arbitration or judicial settlement, creating insurmountable gaps81;b) 
1928/Kellogg-Briand Pact which is generally considered to have outlawed war as an 
instrument of national policy, due to the loophole, it permitted war as an instrument of 
international policy between non-signatories82. The rest is (painful) history: neither of 
these tentative instruments impeded the WWII. Just for the record, there were no rules 
proscribing reprisals against the civilian population, something which led to escalations, 
insofar as all parties considered themselves to be pursuing a just-cause reminiscent of 
the Grotian theory, with the moral hanging on their side. 
The UN/Charter is believed to have closed the gap by peremptorily83 interdicting 
war altogether. Thenceforth no right to go to war (jus ad bellum) properly exists. Rather 
a jus contra-bellum that spares the international community from the “scourge of war” 
(Charter’s preamble) was born. The bedrock thereto was laid down at Article 2(4) which 
mandates that  
“[…]all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations”.  
 
Considering that a jus ad bellum became proscribed, another feature that 
followed was the total severance of ad bellum and in bello issues in legal literature 
about a decade after the WWII84. Irrespective of whichever State provided the final 
thrust to the outbreak of a conflict, the in bello constraints should be borne equally by 
everyone, mainly because of humanitarian concerns and to the fact that legality of 
recourse of force would never be definitely settled between warring parties85. Any other 
fallout setting aside equality would not afford the culpable nation any incentive to 
comply with in bello norms at all86.  
However, some exceptions still warrant the use of force in other nations 
following the approval by the Security-Council using the powers of the Charter’s 
Chapter VII or in case of self-defence:  
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
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of the United Nations, until the Security-Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security(…)”(art.51) 
 
 The Charter speaks of an inherent right of self-defence, understood to be a 
declaration of pre-Charter customary international law87 that continued to exist 
alongside the new contours of the use of force post-San Francisco. Self-defence against 
unlawful armed attack crystallizes the first of the traditional “just-causes” for “just-
war”. Therefore, while legitimate retortions and reparatory countermeasures were 
jettisoned from the unilateral/multilateral initiative lacking the backing of the Security-
Council, there can only be self-defence as a responsive form of military self-help if an 
armed attack occurs88. 
Despite being one fundamental concept in international law, what an armed 
attack really is remains largely unsettled89. Wariness is called for in interpreting 
different, albeit similar, terms present in the Charter. Pursuant to art.31(1) of the 1969 
“Vienna Convention”, perusal shall conform in good faith with the” ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose”.  Perhaps it is easier to define it for what it is not. Armed attack is not 
tantamount to armed conflict. An armed attack, alternatively, can trigger an armed 
conflict, be a part of ongoing hostilities or constitute a measure short of war. As 
O’Connell stated:“Wars, however, do not begin with an attack. They begin with a 
counter-attack”90. Interestingly, because of the independence of ad bellum/in bello, this 
first counter-attack is governed by a different set of criteria (immediacy, necessity and 
proportionality) than actual acts-of-war strikes that would follow the moment self-
defence has been exacted whilst violence continues under a different legal rubric. 
Besides, Jinks asserted that the different fields of application result from two different 
concerns: the self-defence requires a higher standard because it tends to be over-applied 
maximizing the risk of open wars, exactly what the Charter avowed to avoid, whereas 
the problem with humanitarian rules is precisely their under-application91.  
Moreover, the notion of armed attack is not completely absorbed by threat to or 
breach of peace, the subject-matters of the Security-Council. While it is clear that most 
armed attacks violate the spirit of the Charter and perforce constitute a tort eroding 
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international peace, minor attacks cannot purport such comprehensive threats; just as 
unfriendly/hostile acts not involving the employment of military force, otherwise illegal 
under international law, could amount to a threat of peace without being armed 
attacks92. The same could be said about aggression, which consists in a particularly 
serious form of international criminality impinging personal liability to the senior 
officials/military leaders that directly waged wars–of-aggression (crime against 
peace)93. In this case, conspiracy to wage aggression is also criminalized even though 
unlawful (armed) attacks do not ensue94.  Taking into account that the equally authentic 
French text of the art.51 uses the term “aggression armée” instead of armed attack, one 
can deduce that the latter is a subtype of aggression, an armed one95. 
Anyhow, as Gray pointed out the paradigmatic case of armed attack corresponds 
to “an invasion by the regular armed forces of one state into the territory of 
another(…)”96. In the same token, Cassese defined it as “a massive armed aggression 
against the territorial integrity and political independence of a State that imperils its 
life and government”97. The latter concept utilizes the same terminology of art.2(4) of 
the Charter, which is correct since armed attack is something States should refrain from. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that both experts raised the threshold high above to uncontested 
cases of armed attack that nowadays seem more like a relic from the past. If taken too 
literally self-defence could be rendered nigh-obsolete. In the Nicaragua judgment, while 
assessing the attribution of actions of non-state actors to the official government, the 
ICJ stated that: 
 “the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed 
bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and 
effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier 
incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces”(§195).  
 
The decision specified a lower threshold below which transboundary violence 
would constitute a frontier incident instead of armed attack because its scale and effects 
do not compromise security. Dinstein harshly criticized as the attempt to exclude 
“small-scale” armed attacks from the purview of self-defence98. Unless they are 
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obviously “trifling”, some form of response cannot be theoretically excluded99. Schmitt 
concurred that excluding acts of “transitory/sporadic” nature, it is wishful that the 
gravity threshold be markedly low100.  
Some critiques that historical cases pre-Charter cannot dictate the interpretation 
of the customary right to self-defence101 notwithstanding, the Caroline incident is 
widely considered to be the seminal case of the modern idea of restricted jus ad bellum. 
It is especially important for two controversial topics: because the pivotal involvement 
of non-state actors (NSAs) in the absence attribution/imputation of their armed attacks 
to organs controlled by the foreign sanctuary State and, secondly, for the considerable 
leeway granted to the specific use of force in order to anticipate imminent attacks. In 
1837, Upper-Canada, a rebellion was underway against the British crown, while 
sympathetic American nationals offered aid in form of supplies and even enlistment102. 
The Vessel Caroline was usually seen carrying supplies from US territory to the naval 
base in Navy Island103. Fearing that the unwarranted behavior could escalate into direct 
attacks, a British commander mounted a preventive action, at night, before the Caroline 
could enter Canadian territorial waters resulting in at least one violent death onboard, 
the vessel capsized, set ablaze only, then, to be consumed by the Niagara Falls104. The 
US-government denounced what it deemed to be an extraordinary outrage upon its 
sovereignty. In the sequence of a fierce exchange of letters by US-Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, and the British envoys, the former wrote the famous words urging the 
UK to “‘show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation”105. A claim to the permissibility of anticipatory 
self-defence was fleshed out in strict terms that accommodate legitimate responses to 
threats of armed attacks that are imminent, manifest, in progress or at least highly 
probable under the prevailing circumstances106.  
Taking Webster’s formula cautiously, Sofaer advised that it does not apply as a 
general rule-of-thumb for all pre-emptive107 actions, rather only in situations in which 
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the territorial country was not directly responsible for the threats and is both able and 
willing to act accordingly108.  
When it comes to newer threats, a terrorist attack would hardly reach success 
lest total secrecy of its location/timing, therefore making them very difficult to defend 
against109. Equally, as private actors, it would be counterintuitive to adopt the same 
negotiations tactics as with official authorities that tend to act rationally and strike 
agreements at the latest hour averting the utter collapse of bilateral relations110. Besides, 
regarding the danger of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, far exceeding 
conventional armed attacks, by so unpredictable individuals111, the risk to wait the first 
blow, usually against “soft targets” indiscriminately112, is legally and factually 
unbearable. 
  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, former US-Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld stated that “(…)[d]efending against terrorism(…) may well require that we 
take the war to the enemy. The best, and in some case, the only defense, is a good 
offense”113. His words represented the prelude of the move by the Bush administration 
to reserve a right to pre-empt emerging threats long before they are able to operate, 
especially when rogue States and enemies seek the world’s most destructive 
technologies114. The claim for a pre-emptive self-defence responsive to only contingent 
or incipient threats, to a mere possibility among others of future attack, or to capabilities 
not yet operative115 has no basis in customary law whatsoever. The Bush-doctrine, 
dismissed by the 2004 UN High Level Panel on Threats, stretched too far the 
permissibility of contemporary jus ad bellum, in a dangerous move that does deprive of 
credibility the anticipatory self-defence under the Webster’s formula.  
 Additional theories are still attempting to shed more clarity to the customary 
right of self-defence. One of them, known as the “accumulation of events”, purports to 
authorize armed defensive measure against a series of pin-prick assaults emanating from 
the same source which singularly could not be considered as full armed attacks, but set 
together would conform to the gravity and nuisance scale as if they were part of one 
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single phased armed attack116. For instance, Operation Enduring Freedom-(OEF) in 
Afghanistan drew its legitimacy from the past 9/11 attacks considered cumulatively, 
though probably the Pentagon and World Trade Center consummated attacks considered 
separately would have reached the threshold nonetheless.  
The last doctrine of relevance here is the “continuing” self-defence which relies 
on stretching the temporal requirements, not backward to a remote point before an 
actual armed attack occurs (as the pre-emptive one), but rather forward, after one has 
taken place and until the common genetic source of threat is drained. Traditionally the 
immediacy requirement from the Webster’s formula would mandate that there was 
proximity between the attack and the response thereto, without undue time-lag117.  Gill 
dismisses immediacy as an independent criterion based on the unreasonableness of the 
forfeiture of the States’ rights to integrity simply because an instant military response is 
impossible118. In fact, it is hard to picture a really immediate self-defence, in the 
absence of the investigative determination of responsible actors, the mobilization of 
military force and a comprehensive plan of action, all of which require the lapse of 
some time. OEF only started on 7 October 2001, almost one month after the attacks to 
which it was intended to respond.   
Furthermore, Schmitt propounds the simplification of the immediacy criterion 
after the first strike, which already demonstrated ability and intent to pursue similar 
attacks in the future119. This fits perfectly terrorist organizations - the sole purpose of 
which is to spread violence - that launched a campaign of attacks. The victim State 
knows that the likelihood of future attacks being attempted is very high, though exactly 
when/where remains to be determined120. If, cumulatively, an armed attack occurred, 
present the lingering ability and intent to mount similar ones, the immediacy criterion 
will be absorbed by the necessity to react to a continuing threat. Analysis of the treasure 
trove of data found at the Bin Laden’s compound uncovered several plans to mark the 
10th anniversary of 9/11, namely, killing president Obama and sabotaging passenger 
trains121. Al Qaeda demonstrated intent and ability in a campaign of attacks since the 
1998 bombing of the US-embassies in Kenya/Tanzania and the 2000 strike on the USS-
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Cole vessel in Yemen122. A pattern of aggression followed in a public campaign against 
the heretic enemies. Thus, the Neptune Spear, a logical outspread of OEF in 
Afghanistan, not to mention an important concluding chapter thereof, could be framed 
as a lawful exercise of self-defence for past attacks and to continuing threats arising 
alike from the same source.  
 
 
3.2 Response to NSAs (Direct Participants in Armed Attacks) 
 
 Hongju Koh, US-Department of State’s legal adviser, before the Bin Laden’s 
raid, referred in a speech the “in conflict occurring in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we 
continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: a non-state actor, al-Qaeda (as well as the 
Taliban forces that harbored al-Qaeda)”123. The last part of the statement is not well 
precise, since the Taliban became involved as a consequence of the attacks in 
Afghanistan and neighboring areas, when they sidelined Al-Qaeda and resisted the 
operation to disrupt the terrorist camps, not that they, then a not worldwide recognized 
Afghan government, could constructively be considered responsible for 9/11124. The 
Taliban for sure incurred in some form of State responsibility, yet the terrorist strikes 
were not attributed to them125; non-state actors (NSAs) did it.  It is clear that the Obama 
cabinet considers that actions against Al-Qaeda fall within necessary measures of self-
defence. So, considering Bin Laden as the headman of this private group, it is just 
natural that the necessity to defend the nation from further attacks would subsist until he 
was captured or killed. After all, the world could not be safer with Bin Laden at large.  
  Even publicists skeptical to the permissibility of taking action against NSAs 
seem to agree that such groups are capable of mounting devastating attacks126. If they 
are capable of attacking with comparable or stronger force than conventional inter-State 
military maneuvers, then why stand idle and do nothing? Certainly a legal paralysis is 
not the desired outcome when sacred values for the international community are at 
stake. In the wake of 9/11 the NATO for the first time in history invoked the reciprocal 
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principle, regarding the as if committed against all members of the Military Alliance127; 
the OAS followed suit128. The Security-Council in Resolutions n.1368/1373 
acknowledged the incidence of the right of self-defence in response to the atrocities 
perpetrated Al-Qaeda. Not that it needed to do so, inasmuch self-defence vests 
automatically in the occurrence or imminence of an armed attack, there subsists solely 
a duty to report back to the council. In fact, the Security-Council’s presidency published 
a statement, one day after the raid, welcoming that he will not be able perpetrate acts of 
terrorism again129. 
 Nothing in the Charter would imply that defensive response is only admissible if 
the attacks can be somehow connected or imputed to a sovereign territory130. It is even 
inaccurate to imply the ICJ opposes this view: a) in “Nicaragua” attribution through the 
criteria of effective control(§103,195) was the issue at hand, either Salvadorian rebels 
attacks being attributed to Nicaragua or “Contras” attacks to the USA; b) in the “Wall 
Opinion”, the need to avert armed attacks in the form of self-defence action was 
overruled because the threats arose from the same [occupied] territory, not an alien 
ground(§163); finally in the “DRC/Uganda” as the incursions within Ugandan borders 
by NSAs could not be attributed to the DRC, the Court fell short of analyzing, and 
admitted that explicitly, whether under contemporary international law a right of self-
defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces exists(§147).   
Furthermore, the concept of jus ad bellum has been traditionally conceived to 
regulate permissible justifications for the deployment of military force against or in 
foreign territory, not precisely how this force was used, this has been referred preferably 
to human rights or international humanitarian law(IHL)131. Yet, as Schmitt asserted [i]f 
it is permissible to use force in self-defense against terrorist groups, then it is obviously 
permitted to target individual terrorists.”132 It is inevitable, then, that ad bellum issues 
are not kept separately of how defensive force is going to be individualized, despite 
further implications with other international law frameworks. Paust talks about, without 
precisely defining it, an interesting concept of direct participant in armed attacks 
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(DPAA)133 warranting the targeting of individuals directly involved and personally 
responsible for the launching of unlawful attacks against other nations. He takes the 
DPAA notion for granted probably because he considers it to be the logical implication 
of engaging single NSAs.  One could say of a tendency of “privatization” of ad bellum 
implications. Strikingly, being a DPAA entails a status-based liability very similar to 
those enshrined in IHL rules, including a duty of distinction while targeting134. The 
liable human target can be neutralized, either killed (the likely outcome of measures 
taken in foreign land, where the defender does not exact substantial control) or captured, 
as long necessity calls for, while there is ongoing pattern of armed aggression. In case 
of the self-defence capture, a least injurious option, the captured DPAA would not enjoy 
protection as a detainee caught in the actual “theater-of-war”, though would 
nonetheless be entitled to customary/human rights-based standards135.  
Assembling extreme jihadists and some mujahedeens equipped from the times 
of Soviet resistance in the 1980s, the Saudi Bin Laden has been, from the genesis, 
accompanied by his deputy Al-Zawahiri, the mastermind and headman of “al’Qaeda 
al’Askariya”136 movement the purpose of which, as in the self promulgated Declaration 
of War of 1996, was to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and military 
indistinctly137, so as to expel them from the “Holy Lands” and put an end to the 
unwarranted influence over corrupt/feeble Middle-Eastern regimes. Bin Laden gave 
orders to warlike actions from 1996 to September 2001138. In the beginning of the OEF 
he narrowly escaped being hit in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan139, following 
which he vanished until 2011. Meanwhile, even weakened and forced to lead a 
shuttered life, he had been still engaged in the plotting and ordering of terrorist strikes; 
accordingly, he relied on his trusted courier to convey messages to and collect info from 
other Qaedists140. The wingman, Al-Kuwaiti, used to drive ninety minutes from the 
hideout before turning on mobile communications with other terrorist cells scattered 
across the world141; not to mention the 9/11 10th anniversary ongoing plans, irrespective 
of how incipient they still were (continuing, not temporally immediate, threat). 
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Anyhow, it is evidenced that Bin Laden was the foremost DPAA and the top-senior of 
all active members within the structure of Al-Qaeda.   
Significant footholds in domestic law must not be overlooked either. In 2001, 
the US-Congress authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons(…)”142. This provision was tailored exactly to 
persons such as Bin Laden and its application is construed consistently with 
international law143. Still, the AUMF, applied once again concretely on 2nd May/2011, 
does not contravene the long-standing ban on assassination, namely Executive Order-
12,333 which mandates that “[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United 
States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination”. The order 
showed that US-government eagerly wanted to keep distance from the mid-1970s 
controversies concerning covert plots orchestrated by the CIA to assassinate foreign 
high-ranking officials without express presidential approval144. As Parks affirmed more 
than twenty years ago, Executive Order-12,333 was not intended to limit self-defence 
options against legitimate threats to national security of the United States and killing 
under such circumstances would not be classified as neither peacetime-assassination 
(murder of a foreign leader for political purposes) or wartime-assassination (killing by 
treacherous means)145.  
Reliance on Koh’s speech, affirming that the United States is at war with Al-
Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces and may use force consistent with its inherent 
right of self-defence146, led Anderson, convinced that the best counterterrorism strategy 
lies under jus ad bellum considerations, to propound a naked/strong self-defence, that is, 
a self-defence alternative or independent from in bello constraints, in which the means 
and levels of force are not part of any armed conflict147. As well, if successful, the 
defensive strike would not meet the threshold of armed conflict148. Philip Alston 
assailed what he named a “robust” right of self-defence, because it is allegedly built 
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upon a “just-cause”, then conflating elements of jus ad bellum and in bello149. Albeit 
controversial, considering the possibility of armed attacks occurring without triggering 
the notion of armed conflict along with them, matters of self-defence are capable of 
being engaged before the outbreak of hostilities. Still, the criteria (immediacy, necessity 
and proportionality) for jus ad bellum are indeed different; there is no argument against 
that, and Anderson defends that these prongs remain 100% applicable, adding also 
distinction150. A naked self-defence might be the exact presupposition of independency, 
rather than conflation as Alston suggested, of the two historical branches of the “laws of 
war”. Alston, however, in a referral to the law of State responsibility, rightly declared 
that there is no permissible invocation of self-defence as a means to justify violations of 
IHL151. Let it be clear that holding a military measure outside the framework of IHL 
does not violate it head-on, simply because it may not (yet) be applicable in the first 
place.  
Lastly, a cursory word on how the necessity and proportionality principles, 
regulating the level of (re)action in self-defence, stand. They are not posited expressly 
in the Charter or any other legal document making their existence a matter of deduction 
from customary law152. In this point the Caroline incident also prescribed the defender-
nation to demonstrate it “(…)did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act 
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it”153. The ICJ upheld often those limitative principles in relevant 
jurisprudence, just to name a few, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (§41), 
Nicaragua case (§176), Oil Platforms case (§43).  
Necessity dictates that no other alternative is possible to avert an armed attack or 
the imminent threat thereof154. Not all non-military, such as diplomatic, political or less 
injurious coercive measures must be exhausted; of course, there is a test of effectiveness 
of viable alternatives155.  As seen above, Schmitt displaces the immediacy prong after 
the first attack occurred, while the ability and intent to pursue the campaign linger on, 
by inversely strengthening necessity with the “last window of opportunity” test, the 
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definitive moment in which DPAAs are at the cross-hairs of the defensive party156. On 
the other hand, proportionality mandates that no more force is used than actually 
necessary to halt the attack or remove the threat of foreseeable future attacks157. It is 
measured by the size, duration and target of the response158 and the scale and effects of 
the measure undertaken should be roughly commensurate to the armed attack or the 
threat had it been successful159. It is intuitive that necessity restricts or pushes forward 
the constraints on proportionality. Dinstein mentions of a demand for necessary 
counteraction so overwhelming that would justify waging a defensive war160. Whereas 
jus ad bellum limits the initial resort to force, it is established that jus in bello does not 
impede overcoming the enemy and fighting until the end161.   
Thereby, clearly other non-forceful measures were insufficient in the past to 
deter Bin Laden from mobilizing fighters and mounting devastating attacks, the scale 
and effects of which surpassed by far the surgical DEVGRU mission with ground-
troops. On top of that, most likely the Abbottabad raid represented the last chance to get 
him dead or alive before a probable renewed protracted flight, had he been tipped off 
that troops were coming after him.  
 
3.3. Non-Violation of Territorial Sovereignty 
 
 An important issue, upon which the legality of the present case relies, remains to 
be discussed. The raid took place in a sovereign territory wanting the participation or 
previous consent of the territorial State. Was there a violation of Pakistani sovereignty?  
 According to the kernel of the Charter (art.2(4)), territorial integrity and political 
independence occupy - along with the maintenance of peace/security, the development 
of friendly relations and the international co-operation(UN/purposes: art.1)- a sacrosanct 
place as peremptory norms the violation of which is solely acceptable in face of other 
norms detaining equivalent cogency162  
Territorial integrity is not an absolute interest; it cannot logically be if the 
preservation of sovereign jurisdiction over the landmass of one State comes at the 
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sacrifice of the equally paramount integrity of another. This corresponds exactly to what 
self-defence is all about: an exception to the otherwise solid prohibition to a clash of 
military force among States163. In the wake of the first violation of territorial integrity 
by the aggressor’s armed attack it follows a defensive response that has in its 
ontological definition an extant authorization to intrude into the former’s territory and 
force the abuse of its immunity to a standstill. Nothing in the phrasing of the Charter 
implies that consent is needed to act legitimately in self-defence164; in fact, on the 
contrary, it is nonsensical to require it at all. It would virtually render the offended State 
helpless in the case of denial. Hardly any State would explicitly consent to military 
action within its borders, especially when it is the aggressor. Alternatively, had the 
attack been launched by NSAs, the territorial State would attempt to deny the necessity 
of forceful actions within the area it administers or to label them as aggressive rather 
than defensive.  
Accession to the Charter includes, as a premise, consent from each State in 
advance165. In principle, governments are able to pass legislation affecting strategic 
interests and the conduct of their nationals abroad, though they are barred from 
enforcing it166. Extraterritorial law-enforcement measures depend on cooperation and 
consent, which are immaterial to a self-defence response, based on higher threshold of 
violent behavior and different grounds of urging necessity to act on foreign soil and 
prevent a greater catastrophe. The quality of relations involving the countries is at its 
worst, which makes it impossible for cooperation. Thus, the apparent impervious 
territorial immunity from direct interference yields to the exercise of self-defence to 
which 193 sovereign nations, US and Pakistan included, already gave express 
acquiescence167. 
Any other reasoning affording much weight to consent renders self-defence 
nigh-obsolete. Greater risks of going “all the way” and dismissing the whole set of 
restraining principles pertaining defensive counter-action loom if the only exception to 
the contra-bellum thrust becomes inoperative due to unthinkable cooperation between 
mistrustful parties/foes. Consent generally precludes responsibility168, but even at the 
law-enforcement level, consent does not obviate all illegality. The agreement for foreign 
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intervention in one’s territory notwithstanding, a State cannot grant prerogatives it does 
not possess, like authorizing other nation to violate human rights the own government 
could not violate itself169. 
When it comes to attacks perpetrated by NSAs using other countries as safe 
haven or in flight to third countries from where they intend to pursue their vicious 
campaign, a comprehensive cooperation between intelligence, police and military 
agencies is desirable, though not mandatory. The attacked State, as of international 
comity, should, if possible, demand the territorial State to take matters into own hands 
and solve the issue or, through political, judicial and diplomatic channels, such as to 
request for extradition170. Defensive measures are a matter of necessity, not of prior 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. If the impending necessity requires to strike 
immediately, without having time to ask for cooperation or even notify the third 
country171, which might endanger the secrecy of the mission and alert the targets, there 
is no reason to force the offended party to wait until the home country acts, considering 
that it will in a timely and satisfactorily manner.  
Relating to Pakistan, it is possible to assume that some form of tacit acceptance 
exists for US cross-border operations from Afghanistan, spilling over the porous mostly 
common Pashtu areas, sprawling along the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas-
(FATA), a cluster of semi-autonomous frontier provinces in which the extent of 
effective power the central government in Islamabad really exerts is fraught with 
doubts172. Estimated 30/40% of guerilla attacks on troops in the Afghan conflict are 
mounted from the FATA173. The US has responded thereto either with a full-fledged 
drone-campaign, or by chasing, in “hot pursuit”174 the Taliban insurgents back into 
Pakistan or, alternatively, at least since 2008, with a Joint Special Operation Task Force 
(JSOC: Navy-SEALs/Army’s Delta Force)175, of the same kind that was deployed in the 
wee hours of 2nd May against Bin Laden’s refuge.  
Yet, not that the Pakistani government expressly agreed to a written and binding 
instrument giving away part of its sovereignty to Western forces, either US alone or 
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NATO, but it has indulged to military operations targeting foreign fighters and has 
acted as if such consent for each individual operation is not required176. An unconfirmed 
report leaked that, 10 years ago, then president George W. Bush and commander Pervez 
Musharraf covenanted the permissibility of unilateral operations to kill/capture Bin 
Laden in the eventuality he sought residence in Pakistan177. In that scenario, which 
ended up materializing, Islamabad would vociferously decry it as a violation of its 
sovereignty, in a move to assuage domestic public opinion, but it would in fact simply 
look “the other way”178. For the Neptune Spear, the US-Special Forces flew from the 
Bagram-base in Afghanistan, stopped shortly after at the staging Jalalabad-base before 
proceeding into Pakistan179. Despite flying low and using anti-radar systems, their 
presence was eventually noticed by the Pakistani air force that went as far as scrambling 
their jets180. However, eventually the JSOC was not intercepted since they had already 
left Pakistan181. One can only assume that these kinds of actions became common 
business, whereas the responses from Islamabad were likely more rhetorical. 
It is not to be ignored that the US has much more leverage over its bilateral 
relationship with Pakistan than the other way around, making it hard to distinguish 
between tacit agreements and reluctant endurance. Thereby, in absence of clear consent 
the necessity prong shall conform to the “unwilling/unable” test. On the one hand, out 
of the various possible links connecting the NSAs to the official government, the 
unwillingness to react to a legitimate demand of an aggrieved third State by the 
dangerous conduct emanating from the former inner side hovers close to being actually 
complicit with the attacks182.  While turning a blind eye to the misuse of its territory, the 
unwilling State strengthens the sense of impunity and total disregard to common 
international commitments. On the other hand, inability/incapacity to uncover, prevent 
or repress violent strikes relates to a either partially or fully failure of institutional 
mechanisms that should, otherwise, had worked. Besides, it is more likely that country 
lacks control over some part(s) of its landmass, rather than in its entirety.  
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Inasmuch as sovereignty, concretely manifested in the form of territorial 
immunity, constitutes “only” one of the preferred values fleshed out in the Charter183, it 
yields to other principles184, e.g. the protection of international peace/security, as long 
as the country in question does not reasonably abide by the obligation to duly 
police/control what happens within the recognized frontiers, as adjudicated by the 
defunct P.I.C.J. in S.S.Lotus185, and the successor, ICJ, in the Corfu Channel186 
precedents; simply put, nations must not let their territories become a safe haven for 
terrorism and/or serious transnational crime187.  
John Brennan, Obama’s administration senior counterterrorism adviser, despite 
acknowledging that Pakistan has been engaged in the fight against extremism, declared 
severely that it is “inconceivable” that Bin Laden did not rely on a “significant support 
system” in Abbottabad188. Further, president Obama himself reaffirmed that the 
likelihood of a strong network helping him for so long has to be seriously investigated, 
by both countries189. He did not want to jump to any conclusion whether it was someone 
inside at the high or lower echelons of government, or outside190. 
 Anyway, some credence to these assertions must be had. The terrorist chief had 
been living unnoticed at the compound, roughly eight times the size of most houses in 
that neighborhood, a property the official owners could not afford, for at least 5 years191. 
The two/three families living inside were extra cautious by, e.g.: never appearing in 
public or accepting invitations of neighbors; burning trash inside instead of leaving it 
for collection; requiring that bills were sent to an offshore address; not even allowing 
kids to fetch footballs that were tossed astray over the fortified walls; despite visible 
wealth, there was no internet/telephone connection192. On top of that, the complex was 
located just down the road from the top-military academy in Pakistan, within 40 miles 
of the national capital.  
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The compound was shielded by reinforced walls, including a privacy wall 
around the balcony on the third-floor, high enough to keep someone over 
6ft6(1.98m)tall hidden 193. Indeed, someone very tall, nicknamed “the Pacer”, not 
visually identified, went on the patio regularly for circular walking tours, while CIA 
agents were observant from further afield194. To any judicious and prudent observer it 
seemed crystal-clear that someone of highest importance, with numerous enemies, was 
dwelling in there. Nevertheless, for several years Pakistan denied this possibility and 
there were rumors indicating the participation of the Pakistani Inter-Services 
Intelligence-(ISI), a spy agency, in having smuggled Bin Laden from Afghanistan 
through the poorly guarded borders195. It is too complicate to point the finger and 
establish beyond reasonable doubt where responsibility lies, though it transpires 
naturally the duplicitous commitment Pakistan said to have in combating terrorism 
domestically. It is not clear who rules the country, if the military or the civilians. All the 
area classified as FATA, covering the lengthy border with Afghanistan, is scarcely 
administrated by the central government. Many concerns, thus, indeed rose in sharing 
utterly critical information of Bin Laden’s whereabouts with unreliable partners whose 
allegiance has not been totally proven. It is supposed that the Pakistani authorities had, 
at a minimum, 5 years to do their job and finally gainsay where all suspicions were 
leading: Bin Laden took refuge right at their doorsteps. Both Shaun Gregory196, a 
Pakistani scholar, and Leon Panetta197, the CIA-top, stated that someone inside the 
official structure in that country was incompetent or deeply involved/complicit, thereby 
making it fairly that that South-Asian nation was, alternatively, unable or unwilling to 
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4. “JUS IN BELLO” 
 
4.1 Threshold for application and expansion of the “theater-of-war” 
 
 The application of the lex specialis of jus in bello (also known as international 
humanitarian law –IHL199), relies vitally on the outbreak of an armed conflict. And the 
latter is not exactly the same as war. Traditionally, in the technical sense, war depended 
on a declaration that indicated a state of belligerency amongst nations (art.3,HCIII)200. It 
was very perilous to leave up the application of a body of international law contingent 
on the whim of governmental officials that, willingly, could use power animated only 
by reasons of national security and military necessity to the detriment of humanitarian 
considerations201. Alternatively, war in a material sense corresponded to an all-out 
armed conflict that terminated thoroughly all jus pacis relations.  
This is not the rule anymore202. All four 1949-Geneva Conventions have 
identical common triggering mechanisms in their articles 2 and 3. The former provides 
that  
“the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”. 
 
 In case there is a formal acknowledgement of a state of war, even if 
unaccompanied by actual hostilities, the Convention(s) will, nonetheless, apply; the 
novelty refers, however, that the threshold of application was lowered to cover any 
empirical difference arising between two sovereign States and, for it is the unnatural 
course of events in the world order, leading to the intervention of their armed forces, 
irrespective of which legal basis invoked to justify that it is not “making war”, how 
long the given conflict last or how much slaughter takes places203  
 In its turn, common art.3, actually establishing a catalogue of minimum 
humanitarian protective rules to those not taking active part in hostilities, recognizes the 
existence of an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”. Historically a system of gradation 
                                                          
199 Cf. Melzer, Targeted…p.244(fn.9) for other meanings.  
200 Dinstein,War...p.29. 
201 Melzer,id.p.246;also,Dinstein,id.,p.32. 




existed: “rebellions” lay within the domestic affairs of States, whereas “insurgencies” 
implied the inability to easily exact jurisdiction over its territory, imposing, thus, a 
neutrality regime limiting foreign influence only on the side of governmental 
authorities. So, “belligerencies” depicted the scenario in which one of the contending 
parties had risen to a similar level of interstate war204. Despite the palpable reality that 
civil wars existed throughout history205, it took a while before nations could admit that it 
was indeed a legitimate concern of international law to lay down restraints on how they 
engaged in hostilities with their own peoples. It goes without saying that the High 
Contracting Parties to Geneva merely agreed upon a very limited spectrum of posited 
international injunctions206, coupled with an implicit higher threshold to the opening of 
hostilities of non-international character.  
 The ICTY-Tadić decision, concerning the former conflict in Yugoslavia, shed 
light as to the outbreak of an armed conflict: “whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”(emphasis added)207. 
On the one hand, in international armed conflicts-(IACs), organization is presumed to 
exist within regular troops, while protraction is immaterial; on the other hand, in non-
international armed conflicts-(NIACs) the bar was set higher to impede unduly 
interference in national affairs. Firstly, reliance on the organization criterion rules out 
banditry, mob violence or a terrorist acting solo, due to the lack of (sufficient) 
command/control, communication structure, common policy (even if irreconcilable with 
IHL),  recruitment system, weapons and ammunition supply208. Then, the criterion of 
protraction of armed violence, which after the ICTY-Haradinaj case relates rather to 
intensity than proper duration(§49), sweeps away from the core of armed conflict 
unorganized, short-lived insurrections209 and minor “internal disturbances and tensions 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”(art.1(2)APII). As indicia, intensity 
is evinced by type and quantity of heavy weaponry or vehicles, size of troops, extent of 
devastation provoked by shelling of human dwellings, high civilian casualties and mass 
evacuation210...  
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 The expression “Global War on Terror-(GWOT)” does not implicate the 
existence of an armed conflict of global battlefield, fought anywhere as it might please. 
“War” has been used before for rhetorical purposes211, as in “war” against drugs or 
AIDS. Real wars are not waged against common nouns, but proper nouns (identified 
State and NSAs), because only the latter “can surrender and promise not to do it 
again”212. Nevertheless, out of a plethora of distinct responses of counterterrorism 
measures ranging from domestic law-enforcement to intelligence, diplomacy, air-traffic 
security and border control213, there are levels of violence, devastation and respective 
military counter-tactics that amount to armed conflict(s), though the appurtenant legal 
scenario needs to be ascertained on a casuistic-empirical basis214. Any remaining doubt 
as to whether the Geneva Conventions are applicable to the clash between US and Al-
Qaida, or whether fighters captured therein fall in some sort of legal “limbo” of 
protection, were remedied by the US-Supreme Court’s decision on “Hamdan”. 
According to this precedent, the expression armed conflict of non-international 
character-(NIAC) has to be construed in its literal meaning, i.e. in mutual exclusivity 
to international armed conflict-(IAC) and not as synonymous with internal215. NIACs 
do usually spill over borders, sometimes they are fought entirely outside the territory of 
the warring State; accordingly, the best interpretation attached to common art.3 is that it 
was not intended to be geographically bound216. 
 Obama presidency toned down the limitless GWOT rhetoric of the predecessor, 
in a way that it considers itself involved in an armed conflict against Al-Qaida [also 
Taliban and associated forces]217 in Afghanistan and Pakistan (at least the surrounding 
FATA areas)218 and arguably (though controversial) in Yemen. Whether it is classified 
as one wider armed conflict or multiple localized ones219, it is a type of NIAC fought 
entirely outside US-territory, in a sense, a transnational armed conflict of, still, non-
international character, since it does not (anymore) involve actual interstate exchange of 
force. There is no legal loophole to allow the existence of third-type of hostilities, 
because the trigger-mechanisms of common arts.2/3 are comprehensive enough to cover 
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any sort of ongoing and future armed conflicts220. Although sporadic terrorist acts 
certainly do not reach the threshold of violence221, in the course of the protracted OEF, 
hostilities easily crossed that threshold in intensity, while Al-Qaida displayed, either 
alongside the Taliban or by itself, sufficient level of coordination, structure and 
command as an organized armed group party to the conflict capable of sustained and 
systematic offensive222. 
 All the same, it is intuitive that the permissive rules of IHL warranting killing 
without warning and detaining for security reasons do not afford a blank-license to hunt 
down anyone considered an “enemy” anywhere, at any time. Armed conflicts require a 
limited, identified spatial dimension permitting those directly participating therein to 
carry out intense, protracted, armed exchanges223. Accordingly, military 
operations/acts-of-war designed to eliminate resistance and strike military objectives224 
ought to be conducted  within the area-of-war, encompassing the national territories of 
the warring opponents - land, territorial and maritime waters, air-space-, the high-seas 
and the exclusive economic zones, excluded neutralized/demilitarized/hospital or safety 
zones225. Military praxis however, prefers to restrict even further the actual conduct of 
hostilities to a narrow site: the “area of operations” or “theater-of-war”226.   
One of the principal legal consequences of such spatial dimension is that 
belligerents must refrain from intruding into the territory of neutral States, which, on its 
turn, due to a whole set of rights and duties of impartiality and non-participation, can 
stand up with arms to foreclose eventual adverse misuse of its soil227. Notwithstanding, 
it has been argued from time to time that the conventional neutrality law 
(HCV/HCXIII), written over a century ago, according to which there was no option for 
States to freely violate it without risking countermeasures and being dragged into 
hostilities, does not reflect entirely the usus of States that would prefer a milder version 
of it in the form of non-belligerency that would allow them to actually favor one of the 
parties in non-martial matters, such as economy or diplomacy228. Conceded, this is not 
sufficiently established to amount to customary-status, though it seems logically to 












accrue from the current international system restraining use of force, as posited in the 
UN/Charter, pursuant to which the aggressor is outlawed, that the rest of the world 
community cannot treat equidistantly the violator and the victim of a breach of peace229.  
This is especially true in cases of terrorism, which, if the confrontations amount 
to an armed conflict it shall be a NIAC and there is expressly no neutrality implications 
in clashes of such character230. A fortiori, neutrality is specifically not appurtenant to the 
conflict with Al-Qaida, since the Security-Council issued resolution n.1373 imposing a 
duty of forbearance of any action that actively or passively supports terrorist entities, 
including the provision of financial resources, safe haven and criminal impunity. One 
need not go to lengths as former president G.W. Bush’s “you are with us or you are 
with them”, but it is obvious that there is no possible justification layer to defend 
impartial treatment of renegade non-state armed groups and aggrieved national States.   
 Anyhow, regarding the Afghan NIAC, Pakistan cannot be classified as non-
belligerent, let alone as full-status “neutral”, simply because it is an important ally of 
the coalition forces, having lent parts of the territory to the passage of convoys and 
ammunitions countless times. Islamabad is involved in military action within national 
borders231 aimed at resisting attempts, also by the Taliban and perhaps by the outliving 
Al-Qaida members in refuge, to destabilize central rule. It is, thus, hard to separate, in 
practice, where the geographic limits of OEF ends and domestic Pakistani “conflicts” 
begin. Cross-border operations against Al-Qaida and Taliban fighters inside Pakistani 
territory are already a reality232. It is natural that operations, linked to the NIAC on the 
other side of the frontier, that spill over to Pakistan belong to that same existing 
NIAC233. In a way, terrorists are conscious of their inferior military power and, as 
typical in asymmetric structures of combat, have purposefully sought to disregard 
consolidated rules, intermingle with the civilian population and expand the spatial-
continuum of battlefield in order to be able to call “game-on/game-off” at will234.   
Clearly, such scenario is not equivalent to a combatant on leave outside the area-
of-war that has effectively disengaged from battle neither is it equivalent to a fleeing 
terrorist fighter in Paris or London, where his capacity to wreak damage is outmatched 
by the close exercise of jurisdiction to contain and bring him to account. Lewis defends 
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that the application of the Tadić criteria of protraction/intensity and organisation must 
not be strictly tied to unreasonable geographic limits in IACs or “transnational” NIACs, 
because they risk benefitting the same entities IHL toilsomely disfavors235. The 
existence of an armed conflict, according to him, should be assessed on the degree of 
violence the existing parties mutually exchange as a whole, not on the degree that might 
exist in only one specific locality236. In other words, once an armed conflict is 
underway, the “war goes where the fighter goes”, as ruled during WWII (e.g. the 
shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto’ aircraft, commander of the Japanese fleet, far 
from the hot-zones of hostilities237).  
Qaidists like Osama Bin Laden and close aides fled to Pakistan with the purview 
of reassembling human and financial resources, to enjoy safe haven, while the 
“sanctuary” State is either unwilling or unable to perform international commitments, 
and should not magically regain immunity qua civilians. Therefore, it appears that a 
belligerent is permitted to expand the area-of-operations if necessary to properly exert 
self-defence238. It is a fact that the combat has already engulfed certain localities of 
Pakistan239 across the uncontrolled borders and that jus ad bellum may have closely 
implicated to this thrust. In any case, it does not matter to jus in bello whether this 
expansion was totally justified or not, whether it affected sovereign rights240, the 
hostilities paradigm is already applicable to the new theater-of-war, with the caveat that 
operations must be intimately attached to the OEF in Afghanistan.  
 
4.2 Civilian/Combatant statuses241  
 
 The touchstone of armed conflict relies on the concept of hostilities. Be it war in 
the former de jure sense or armed conflict in de facto sense, IHL does not bother with 
the motives that led to such a state of affairs, it condones the inevitable violence kept to 
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a level of fair play. Hostilities, “the [collective] resort by the parties to the conflict to 
means and methods of injuring the enemy242”, is military violence internationally 
permitted. Accordingly, whoever can/cannot be distinctly targeted must be strictly 
defined, as well as whoever is bestowed with a right to participate in the hostilities and, 
finally, what happens to someone that unlawfully participates therein nonetheless.  
 Francis Lieber wrote in 1863 that “(t)he principle [of distinction] has been more 
and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, 
and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit."243. It was not until the 18/19th-
centuries that the notion that wars were not waged against civilians and the population 
should stay out of hostilities as much as possible arose to the mainstream of military 
thinking244. Protection of civilians, dependent on always distinguishing combatants 
from non-combatants, is the bedrock of modern IHL245. Thus, the principle of 
distinction, whence the general immunity arising from the effects of hostilities 
(art.51(1)API) accruing to civilians draws its strength, amounts to one of the cardinal 
principles, together with unnecessary suffering, of customary-IHL246. Not strikingly the 
ICRC, in its Customary Law Study-(CLS), paid tribute to the principle of distinction by 
drafting it as Rule/1247. 
 Combatant is a term-of-art describing mainly the members of the organized 
armed forces, a defense organ, belonging to a party to the conflict248 and subject to 
responsible command and disciplinary system (art.43(1)API). Membership in the armed 
forces depends exclusively on a formal integration regulated by domestic law249, even if 
the singular individual does not have a functional duty of combat, i.e., whether he 
performs an indispensable function in the use of weapons/weapon-systems250. Each 
member of the armed units, with the exception of medical and religious personnel, has a 
combatant privilege, which includes a right to participate in hostilities (art.43(2)API) – 
roughly an entitlement to engage/attack enemy combatants not [yet] placed hors-de-
combat or civilians participating directly in hostilities using lawful means and methods 
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of  warfare251 – and the corollary post-capture immunity252 from being prosecuted for 
lawful acts-of-war that would, otherwise, be ordinarily penalized by domestic law253. It 
means that the primary-status of combatant entails a secondary-status of prisoner-of-
war (POW) if detained by the enemy side254(art.44(1)API). Additionally, anyone with 
combatant privilege is obliged to distinguish (her-)himself from the civilian population, 
traditionally clad in uniform and carrying arms openly (art.1,HIVR;art.4(A)(2)GCIII), 
on pain of forfeiture of POW-status (art.44(4)API). The drawback of being bestowed 
with the combatant privilege consists in the standing liability (or in NIAC, arguably, an 
“occupation hazard”) of being lawfully attacked255.  
 The onset of guerilla, militias, resistant movements and other irregular armed 
forces was not overlooked by IHL. In IAC they need to fulfill similar criteria to which 
primary-status of the regular State forces is submitted, namely: they must be organized, 
lack a duty of allegiance to the detaining power, belong to a party of the conflict, wear a 
distinctive emblem and carry arms openly (art.1,HIVR;art.4(A)(2)GCIII)256. 
Traditionally, they would have to act in accordance with the “laws and customs of war” 
(art.1(4)HIVR;art.4(a)(2)(d)GCIII). API has been severely criticized for having 
loosened to significant extent some of the original criteria of legitimate irregular forces 
– newly, transgressors of IHL would retain POW-status, albeit subject to prosecution 
for war crimes; and regarding compliance with the duty of distinction it suffices to carry 
arms openly while visible to the enemy and during each military engagement 
(art.44(3)API)257. This is one of the reasons for the denial of the US, among other major 
military powers, to ratify the protocol258; thus, these modifications can hardly be seen as 
consolidating customary law.  
 In NIAC the situation is even more convoluted. Whereas the regulation of 
membership of regular forces is assumed to be similar with that in IAC259, it is arguable 
whether there is a right to participate in hostilities in NIAC pertaining anyone260, but at 
least a truncated form (without POW-status) thereof should be recognized to members 
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of governmental forces261. The lack of POW-status is one of the remaining differences 
between international law regulating IAC and NIACs262. NIACs constitute since the 
WWII the predominant form of warfare worldwide263. Understandably, States are 
reluctant to granting any form of legitimacy for oppositional groups to defy them with 
military force, which implies that no irregular forces can claim POW-status to their 
captured fighters264. In principle, anyone fighting the government, while not entitled to 
do so, would be classified as “unlawful/unprivileged combatant” liable to domestic 
criminal prosecution265. This terminology has been used by the US-Department of 
Defence Directives and the national Military Commissions Act applying to captured 
Taliban/Al-Qaida fighters266 detained in Guantánamo-Bay deprived of the POW-
protection conferred by GCIII267. However, since IHL does not per se prohibit direct 
participation in hostilities(DPH) for groups of individuals outside the formal structure of 
the military units, this expression is better understood in relation to domestic law and 
should not be misconstrued to warrant a third category in-between combatants and 
civilians268.  
 Unlike JSOC troops (DELTA-Forces/Navy-SEALs) that clearly were lawful 
combatants under IHL269, Osama Bin Laden and his aides were not. As Dinstein pointed 
out, not even when Al-Qaida members were fighting alongside the Taliban in 
Afghanistan they could be classified as combatants270. Despite belonging to a party of 
the conflict and of the internal organization, they declined to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population and relentlessly disregarded IHL compliance in the 
execution of terrorist attacks against the former271(art.51(2)API), in the area of conflict 
and abroad, regardless of nationality. A stronger reason: the structure of international 
law regulating NIAC itself withholds any legal combatant-status to Bin Laden, 
irrespective of his continuous involvement in unlawful hostilities (of the worst form). 
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To say merely that he was an “unlawful combatant” is not sufficient to pinpoint his 
liability of being made the object of an attack. 
 Nor did he appear to be civilian. The latter is a term mutually exclusive (and 
fully complementary), with combatant272. The way in which the definition of civilian 
(art.50(1)API) was drafted by alluding laconically to any person who does not belong to 
any of the combatants categories (art.4(A)(1)(2)(3)(6)GCIII/art.43API) has the 
advantage of being ne varietur273, i.e. by being a negative definition it does not vary in 
case any new definition of combatant ensues, leaving no loopholes that might 
jeopardize the protection due to peaceful, non involved civilians.  The only way a group 
of civilians can immediately turn into legal combatants refers to a situation of a mass 
levy in unoccupied territories facing the onrushing of hostile troops in which the 
inhabitants spontaneously take up arms to defend the locality without having time to 
organize themselves, but they too must carry arms openly and abide by IHL 
(art.4(A)(6)GCIII). Anyhow, a genuine civilian has the exactly opposite status as a 
combatant, including no right of DPH, no duty to distinguish oneself from other 
civilians, a status-based standing immunity from direct attack and a conduct-based ad 
hoc liability (or hazard) to be attacked while engaged in DPH, and only then274.  
 The tendency of excessive “civilianization” of modern-day conflicts has put the 
principle of distinction anew under strain. There has always been some unavoidable 
form of civilian involvement in the general war-effort275. However, as more and more 
civilians participate in the actual conduct of military operations, the battleground has 
made foray into heavily populated areas276. Many activities were outsourced to civilian 
contractors or civilian intelligence, resulting in a serious twofold insecurity: innocent 
people at the wrong place and wrong time are at increased risk of being mistakenly 
targeted by trigger-happy combatants or for unknowingly having contributed directly to 
combat, just as regular troops, once trained to protect peaceful civilians, but frightened 
for their own security, are at risk of being attacked by people they cannot duly 
identify277. 
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 It is actually clear that the standing immunity/protection afforded to civilians is 
lifted only if and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities-(DPH)(art.3GCI-
IV;art.51(3)API;art.13(3)APII)278. Nevertheless, the theoretical quarrel is characterized 
basically by precisely which conduct amounts to DPH, the temporal limits and 
modalities that govern the loss of protection279. The ICRC/DPH-Guidance, though not a 
unanimous document, offers a balanced view fostering a “clear and coherent 
interpretation of IHL consistent with its underlying purposes and principles”280. To 
begin with, it is quite logical that the notion of DPH encompasses necessarily elements 
of hostilities and direct-[active281] participation therein282. There is a total assimilation 
between them: the overarching concept of hostilities corresponds exactly to the total 
sum of specific hostile acts engaged by all persons, either combatants (de jure) or 
civilians (de facto), during an armed conflict, with the intent to defeat the enemy; 
whereas direct participation refers to the same specific hostile acts per se, of each 
person considered individually283, it is considered on a case-by-case basis284.  
Furthermore, individual hostile acts to qualify as DPH must cumulatively fulfill 
three requirements considered hereafter. Firstly, the harm likely to result (and not the 
one actually materialized) from its commission must attain a certain threshold either 
adversely affecting the military capacity of a party to the armed conflict, regardless of 
the quantitative gravity, or inflicting at least (minimum of gravity required) injury, 
death to people and destruction to objects protected with standing immunity. Hence, Bin 
Laden continuously committed command acts with high likelihood of begetting severe 
harm in terms of countless fatal and seriously wounded civilian people and their objects 
(soft targets) as well as he indiscriminately intended to diminish the military capacity of 
regular armed forces, of the countries he attacked, in responding effectively and timely 
to the eventuation of the attacks he masterminded. 
 Secondly, the act must directly provoke harm, individually or as an integral part 
of collective operations, in one causal step, meaning that indirect contributions far 
removed in time and place from the attacks (unless the causation of harm remains 
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direct, e.g. by use of time-controlled bombs)285, like providing food, shelter, producing 
ammunition to the general war-effort do not suffice, whereas providing or transporting 
the ordnance, collecting information or training a team, all especially required to mount 
a specific operation aimed at reaching the threshold of harm subsume to the causal link 
requirement286. Accordingly, as the headman of Al-Qaida, it is not hard to refute that, 
although he was not physically present in the launching of terrorist attacks, since most 
of them required suicide-bombers, his contribution by far surpassed the mere war-
sustaining activities of that organization; it was an integral part of the whole process 
that was likely to cause the threshold of harm in one causal step.  
Thirdly, the last requirement of DPH is the belligerent-nexus of the [chain of] 
hostile act(s) imposing that, not only they become objectively linked to the conflict, but 
also that they are designed to directly cause the threshold of harm in support of one of 
the parties (or in its behalf) and, conversely, in detriment of the other counterpart(s), 
independently considered from any subjective hostile intent the person(s) considered 
might house287. General criminal violence, civilian unrest or inter-civilian violence at 
large with no nexus to the armed conflict (unless it triggers independent armed 
conflict(s)), legitimate individual self-defence, even during war, against unlawful 
assault and violence committed in the exercise of power over controlled, detained 
and/or vulnerable people not pertaining to the actual conduct of hostilities, all lack the 
required belligerent-nexus288. Hence, not only was the Al-Qaida leader supporting one 
party (his own group) to the detriment of another, he was acting on its behalf and 
organizing hostilities spearheaded by himself in a self-declared war.  
Finally, it is important to underscore that the preparatory measures intimately 
linked as an integral part of the hostile acts, just as much as the deployment and return 
from the military-like acts perpetrated, constitute the sufficient temporal frontiers to lift 
the civilian-immunity, and not exclusively during the actual execution of the act289. 
Moreover, before and after these temporal restraints the civilian regains normal status-
based immunity290. Any doubt arising in the moment of targeting whether activity-based 
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loss of protection is pertinent to the case, a presumption of civilian status overrides 
DPH291. 
 Howsoever Osama Bin Laden had lost protection against attack in the moment 
the Special Forces stormed his compound, and most likely he (just as his aides) was in 
situation of DPH when targeted, it is does not seem right that his civilian-immunity was 
the norm, and loss of protection the exception, considered that the notion of civilian-
DPH was drafted mainly to provide a sensible answer to spontaneous, sporadic or 
unorganized civilian active involvement in hostilities292, whereas not being adequate to 
someone that is so integrated into an armed group party to the conflict and repeatedly 
incurs in DPH, with the result of assuming a continuous combat function (CCF)293. The 
“revolving door” by which civilians lose and regain protection in the intervals of their 
acts amounting to DPH is the proper, rather than a-normal, functioning of the temporary 
loss of immunity, and clearly does not befit members of organized armed groups294.  
In NIACs the respect for the principle of distinction inevitably depends on 
identifying the parties thereto, which according to the essence of the treaty provisions 
dealing with these kinds of armed conflict, can be characterized by State regular forces, 
dissident forces and other organized armed groups, while civilians [as normal rule] “do 
not bear arms”(art.3,GCI-V;art.1,APII)295. If regular armed forces are deployed, they 
retain their combatant privilege while conducting hostilities on behalf of a State. What 
about the other side? It is problematic to think that the entire armies of NSAs remain 
part of the civilian population296, thus members unequivocally affiliated to the military 
wing (not political/administrative or even humanitarian wings) are functionally 
incorporated into battle with a de facto CCF, albeit divested of a legal entitlement to de 
jure combatant privilege under IHL297.  
In other words, these individuals lose their civilian-status, unless they through 
conclusive behavior disengage from CCF in an armed group298, acquiring conversely 
attributes qua [combatant] membership-based standing attack liability299. Hayashi warns 
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for the perils of a pseudo-status of “quasi-combatants” without a right or fact of 
DPH300. Besides, they are not duty-bound nor given incentives to actually distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population (perhaps it would be “suicidal” to clash openly 
with regular armed forces), which, ultimately, might threaten, instead of augmenting the 
importance of the principle of distinction301. Especially the second statement, accruing 
from the lack of a right of DPH, is very weighty. It is unconceivable that on the short-
run States will agree upon affording lawful combat privilege to non-State armed groups; 
nonetheless, it is possible to alleviate some of the problems by keeping a minimum 
acceptable compliance with IHL, based on which individuals could be rewarded post-
conflict with amnesty for mere violations of domestic law, considered that no grave 
breaches of international law took place. On the other hand, I respectfully disagree 
partially with the first statement that CCF does not rely on a fact of DPH. Hayashi 
points to a passage in which the continued intent to carry out unspecified hostile acts is 
assimilated to the notion of CCF302; as a consequence, he fiercely opposes a strictly 
intent-based participation continuity and proposes a strictly function-based approach to 
circumvent many of the conceptual problems303. However, it is not clear that the 
document preferred an intent-based liability. In fact, the DPH-Guidance elsewhere 
already affirms that the criterion to membership in organized armed group is the strictly 
functional one304, translated into a de facto assumption of CCF305, expressed possibly by 
the carrying of uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons and with the extant 
repeated acts of DPH306.  
 To sum up, Osama Bin Laden had not a civilian status; he was an “unlawful 
combatant” (pursuant to US-domestic law), founder and commander of an organized 
armed group party to a NIAC with a CCF therein. The fact that he was probably 
engaged in some form of DPH when he was killed does not alter the fact the he could be 
targeted at all times, within the expanded theater-of-war, unless he had previously 
conclusively disengaged from warlike activities.  











4.3 Principles in targeting 
  
 It is the principle of military necessity that makes IHL particular. It allows 
slaying, injuring and wrecking in furtherance of military goals. In fact, it gives leeway 
for a belligerent to apply the amount of raw force appropriate to 
“achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial 
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum 
expenditure of life and resources307”.  
 
Meanwhile, it is counterintuitive that military necessity does not correspond to a 
juggernaut; resort thereto in a “limited warfare” context rather prescribes responsibility, 
as unnecessary and wanton destruction of non-valuable targets308, coupled with directly 
impinging harm against civilians must be absolutely recoiled from. 
 Hence, in application of the overarching rule of distinction, belligerents have a 
duty  
“at all times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct 
their operations only against military objectives”(art.48 API).  
 
Therefore, everyone/everything that carries the “civilian”-attribute received 
immunity from direct attack309, as only military objectives can be the ultimate goal of a 
military campaign. In its turn, military objectives correspond to  
“those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military 
advantage”(art.52(2)API).  
 
Two elements build up the essence of a military objective. First of all, due to, 
alternatively, intrinsic characteristics (nature of weapons systems and cache, 
fortifications, combat vehicles etc.310), geographic disposition (location of bridge or any 
built-up area311), or intended future use or present function (purpose or use, 
respectively, of otherwise civilian objects312), the object at hand makes an objective 









contribution to the military action of the defending part313. Only military action will 
suffice, i.e. the actual “war-fighting/defending capabilities”, thus being far-fetched the 
mention to the equivocal “war-sustaining capabilities” in the US-Military Manual314. 
Simultaneously315, or simply cumulatively316, a definitive, not potential or 
indeterminate317 military advantage, being the subjective element pertaining to the 
attacking part318, accrues from that object having its function discontinued, being 
struck, leveled to the ground or solely occupied by enemy forces. According to the 
ICRC/API-Commentary, “a military advantage can only consist in ground gained and 
in annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces”319, translated in the conclusion 
that notional targets aimed at shaking the morale, confidence and support of the civilian 
population are, to say the least, very doubtful, because there is no tangible military 
advantage obtained320.  
Anyway, it is obligatorily a two-prong test, despite the difference between 
contribution to military action and offering of a definitive military advantage is 
slight, the total abandon of the two constitutive elements will allure the attacking part in 
claiming that civilian objects, while not normally helping with the military action, 
nonetheless presents some military advantage321. Thus, the compound in Abbottabad, 
serving somewhat as Al-Qaida’s headquarters, and all information inside pointing to the 
identity of terrorist cells, the execution of past and the plotting of future attacks, 
contributed by way of its present use to the unlawful military action against soft and 
coalition targets, the neutralization of which granted an extraordinary military 
advantage in the “war” against Al-Qaida.  
 The term military objective does not encompass only objects, but also lawful 
human targets322. As seen, they become military objectives by way of their statuses or, 
exceptionally, momentary or continuous action. Yet, particularly in small-scale 
operations directed toward a handful of selected individuals323, in which there is a 
clearly superior army, some voices advocate that there is a lesser necessity in using 
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awesome power against “weaker” belligerents324; hence, an attempt to arrest/detain 
should be preferred to targeting to kill325 when there is “manifestly no need to use lethal 
force”326. The particular asymmetric conflict structure brings the reality closer to 
peacetime operations, though still within an armed conflict327, as lethally engaging 
fighters buying groceries in a supermarket/shopping center or sitting in a restaurant328 
would be completely uncalled for. Apparently, these aspirations suit better internal 
NIACs or occupation329 where the control/jurisdiction of the dominant belligerent 
propitiates moderation in military force. This is not commensurate to extraterritorial or 
transnational NIACs, such as the case at hand, and regardless of how appealing it may 
sound based on a humanitarian principle, as of lex lata there is no impediment at all to 
engage lethally lawful human targets.   
 Moreover, lawful targets need to be lawfully engaged. Just as direct attack 
against civilians and civilian objects, an indiscriminate attack, which in its essence does 
not distinguish properly between valid military objectives330, is just as illegal.  It is 
immaterial whether the attacker wants to deliberately harm civilians or he recklessly 
demonstrates no concern to the duty of distinction331. Indiscrimination in targeting was 
posited in art.51(4)(a-c)(5)(a)API, according to which there are basically two forms of 
indiscriminate attacks. The first type relates to those of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction, either due to the 
intrinsically indiscriminate nature of the particular means and methods-of-warfare used 
or due to the non-attempt at all to identify specific military objectives and direct attacks 
towards them332 or to limit the effects of discriminate means/methods. Second type: to 
treat clearly separated and distinct military objectives collocated within populated 
civilian built-up areas as a single entity333, such as the practice of carpet-bombardment 
in WWII334, are also indiscriminate. Obviously the Neptune Spear did not resort to 
indiscriminate attacks, inasmuch as “small-scale” military operations specifically 
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individualized and aimed at single high-value persons, as a general rule, are extremely 
discriminate335. 
 Moving on into the principles governing the conduct of targeting in operational 
law, the next one prohibits discriminate attacks that are, however, disproportional. It is 
codified in art.51(5)(b)API. It appears that the collocation of proportionality as a 
subtype of indiscriminate attacks is somewhat incorrect336. The inaccuracy at the time 
the protocol was drafted, using the same wording of “precautions in attack” as a basis, 
is justified, however, in the extent that there is not much to separate extremely 
disproportionate attacks, wreaking extensive civilian losses and damage337, from 
indiscriminate attacks per se. Several critiques338 underscored the inadequacy of relating 
dis-proportionality with indiscrimination (and extensive with excessive “collateral-
damage”), and they are mostly correct in that disproportional attacks are still 
discriminate, though just as well unlawful. Thereby, this additional constraint in IHL 
proscribes attacks which  
“may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”(art.51(5)(b)API).   
 
Historically, as soon as an objective had been characterized as military, any 
extant damage and unavoidable injury caused to civilians fell under the umbrella of 
acceptable “collateral-damage”339. Clearly, this concept outrages our very notion of 
humanity. Hence, a compromise between military necessity and humanitarian 
requirements was drawn340, holding that a balance of both sides ought to govern 
permissibility of operations under armed conflict. It is a compromise, rather than the 
absolute prevalence of the principle of humanity, simply because it is impossible to 
exclude all probability that non-involved civilians are going to be hit in the crossfire341. 
And it is impossible to always conduct hostilities far away from populated centers, 
which are never fully bereft of military objectives, and weapons always display a dud-










rate. Such acknowledgement that certain degree of involuntary harm will invariably 
impact on innocent lives makes it possible to wage war, how regrettable it might sound.  
 Thus, the crux of the issue, the tipping-point in which the “body count” nudges 
the balance to the side marking “disproportional”, depends rather on what a reasonable 
arbiter would have expected or should have known (foreseeability), not in hindsight, but 
in possession of the phased and incomplete information he secured in the midst of the 
“fog-of-war”, that is, in the shifting circumstances prevailing at the time, with 
allowance for honest mistakes342.  
On the side of the collateral-damage to civilian objects, incident [(non)-fatal] 
injury to civilian or any possible combination thereof, only non-targetable civilians are 
included, thereby excluding DPHs, non-combatant militaries or personnel hors-de-
combat343, not forgetting that, in doubt, the civilian character will be automatically 
assumed (art.50(1),art.52(3)API). Beyond that, also indirect harm (not only 
direct/immediate) arising from the strike that was foreseeable, like widespread damage 
to the environment, has to be calculated344. Conversely, on the side of the military 
advantage, merely concrete and direct (perhaps meaning also 
probable/reasonable/foreseeable/specific/perceptible/substantial /relatively close) will 
be weighed against345. The political goals of the war, even national survival, do not 
permit wreaking more collateral-damage346. Additionally, it has to be borne in mind that 
the advantage accrues from the military attack as a whole (overall as in the Rome 
Statute-art.8(2)(b)(iv)), not considered only from isolated or parts thereof347.  
Some argument that the security of the own attacking forces is comprised in the 
assessment348. Schmitt said that “an attack in which the personnel or equipment are lost 
is self-evidently not as advantageous as one in which they survive to fight again”, a 
statement to which Henderson apparently concurs, though he highlights that it does not 
form a third-issue in the proportionality balance nor overrides collateral-damage349.  
In the raid last year, not only was the military advantage expected sky-high, as 
the actual advantage accruing from the operation was, indeed, justified. The collateral-
damage was kept at a bare minimum. Allegedly, there were 22 people living the 
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compound at the moment the SEALs stormed in350, of which 17 survived. Four of the 
deceased were not protected by the proportionality scope: besides 54 year-old Bin 
Laden-(CCF), his personal courier, Al-Kuwaiti, and his brother, Abrar, were killed in 
the function of Al-Qaida’s headman closest aides-(CCF/DPH), just as his son Khalid, 
who plunged at the commando (probably DPH). The only incidental death appears to 
have been Abrar’s wife, Bushra, hit while standing next to her husband351.  Accounts of 
women having been used as human-shields circulated the media352. If they were used 
involuntarily, there is absolutely no relevance to proportionality-assessment, since an 
act bereft of volition cannot be interpreted in detriment of someone that did not 
contribute to the shielding of military objectives in any way. Voluntary human-shields 
spark more controversy in the regard that those women might have willingly attempted 
to obstruct the operation. However, unless they were actually assisting the lawful 
targets, such as diverting attention to facilitate an attack353, it is generally believed that 
the conduct of human-shields, regardless of imposing a time-consuming “moral 
pause”354, does not constitute real violence against the other party nor does reach the 
threshold of harm to amount to DPH355, especially in situations where the attacker has 
the upper hand. By standing deliberately within the danger zone, the human-shield 
assumes more risk upon (her-)himself356, but retains full civilian-status. Therefore, the 
woman casualty was included at the time the proportionality was gauged, and no matter 
how lamentable, it was not excessive enough to tarnish the raid.  
Finally, avoidable collateral-damage, despite being proportional, will not be 
permissible357, imposing, rather, a duty to take precautions in attack (art.57,API). 
Precautionary measures constitute an extra protective-layer with the purview of 
avoiding and, in any event, minimizing incidental injury/damage to civilians358; lest 
avoidable repercussions to civilian life are ignored altogether, an option that does not 
cater the humanitarian scope of IHL, those measures strengthen compliance with the 
principle of proportionality at the final desired stage.  
                                                          











A double set of obligations emanate thence to commanders and ground-troops 
alike. A responsible military senior-officer must take constant care and has clearly a 
duty of verification, a duty to collect sufficient information and a duty to clarify the 
nature of the objective359. Equally, the officers charged with carrying out the mission, 
although not possessing the overall overview of the military situation, if taken by 
surprise of a turn of events affecting the nature of the objective or the ratio of 
proportionality, must call off the attack360.  
The issuance of warning, one precautionary suggestion, to the residents of the 
compound in Pakistan would have blatantly jeopardized the success of the 
counterterrorism mission. Moreover, the choice of warlike means was extensively 
discussed resulting in the original plan to bomb the place eventually being discarded for 
concerns with avoidable civilian casualties, difficulties in identification of the deceased 
and the amount of ordnance needed to level the entire ground361. The Special 
Commando (DELTA-Forces/Navy -SEALs/DEVGRU), then, became the natural option 
to secure the military advantage anticipated, while at the same time assuring the least 
possible scenario of incidental injury and unnecessary fatalities. The raid was, as a 
matter of law, aimed at military objectives, discriminate, and proportional; beyond that, 




 It remains to be discussed whether Neptune Spear has employed any prohibited 
means or methods-of-warfare.  Limitation to the brutal power of weapons in real life, 
known as “temperamenta belli” by Grotius363, is a response to the risks of total war, the 
unfettered type of warfare in which the level of force is more than admissible and 
“necessaria ad finem belli”364. Therefore, the lawfulness of the warlike means and 
methods are gauged in keeping with the extent of the principle of military necessity, 
counterbalanced in the light of the principle of humanity.  









This idea was conveyed firstly as “(t)he right of belligerents to adopt means of 
injuring the enemy is not unlimited”(art.22,HIVR). Seventy years later, a basic rule 
codified that “(i)n any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose 
methods or means-of-warfare is not unlimited”(art.35(1)API).   
 According to Boutruche, the expression “means”(of-warfare) comprises, 
traditionally, weapons, weapons-system or platforms employed for the purposes of 
attack365, whereas “methods”, a new term in positive law, designates the way or 
manner in which weapons are used366 as well as any specific, tactical or strategic ways 
of conducting hostilities with the purpose weakening and overwhelming the enemy, 
even if not directly related to weapons367. In this legal opinion the only proscribed 
methods analyzed, due to their particular relevance in special commando raids, are 
perfidy and denial-of-quarter, which, if utilized in the course of the operation at hand, 
would leave an irremediable illegality stain.  
 Firstly, however, a brief word on the weapon used by the DEVGRU-team to gun 
down Bin Laden. Some restriction on weaponry was set forth because military necessity 
is not commensurate to senseless cruelty; it abhors superfluous injury (maux superflus) 
or unnecessary suffering368(art.35(2)API). By all indications, the weapon used at the 
scene  to shoot a “double tap” to the terrorist leader’s chest and head was a M-16 type, 
manufactured by the German “Heckler and Koch”, namely HK416 rifle369. It belongs to 
the gamut of combat lawful weaponry and it is actually used by several armed forces 
worldwide370.  
 Now the focus switches to methods-of-warfare. A certain amount of deception is 
inescapable in war.  In that way, it is permissible to employ cunning stratagems, 
including, but not limit to, camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation 
with the goal to mislead the enemy and make him act recklessly (art.37(2)API). This set 
of tactics constitutes permissible “ruses-of-war” that encompasses also surprise attacks 
and ambushes as well as inciting the adversary troops to rebel, mutiny or desert through 
the discredit of loyalty and morale371. However, perfidy separates itself from 










permissible ruses, as tradition (art.23(b)HIVR), as long as the deception level includes 
treachery372. In the same token, art.37(1)API exhorts  
“(i)t is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. 
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is 
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall 
constitute perfidy.”  
 
Hence, illegality lies precisely in instilling in the enemy combatant a false trust 
regarding the existence of peremptory protection under IHL and exploring this induced 
misconception with the necessary eventuation of death, wounds or capture373. The 
pivotal example at this point, which is the classical “wartime-assassination”374, refers to 
the feigning of civilian/non-combatant status (art37(1)(c)), in order to approach the 
enemy without the underlying hostile intent of the mission being noticed or giving him 
opportunity to mount guard.  Accordingly, undercover operations, using plain clothes 
troops, the sole purpose of which is the targeted killing of a selected individual are 
always unlawful, since they misuse the standing civilian-immunity, jeopardizing the 
wholesale protection due to genuine civilians375. Nonetheless, the Special Commando 
acted on surprise (the very success of the operation depended thereon), a perfectly 
acceptable ruse of-war, without inviting the confidence of Bin Laden that he would be 
protected or that he should accord protection to apparent “civilians”, while donning a 
distinguished military uniform. 
  Whereas the prohibition of perfidy relies on ensuring minimal good faith among 
clashing parties in the heat of hostilities, the prohibition of denial-of-quarter appeals to a 
humanitarian sentiment to show mercy to the enemy that offer no longer resistance376. It 
is founded on the belief that a former enemy rendered hors-de-combat because of 
wounds, sickness, maritime or aerial distress, i.e. defenceless, or that simply laid down 
his arms, possibly after fighting to the limit of his strength and energy, must not be 
liquidated377.  Traditionally, it is proscribed “to declare that no quarter will be given” 
(art.23(1)(d)HIVR), while recently the preferred wording implies that “it is prohibited 
to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to 









conduct hostilities on this basis”(art.40API)378. Etymologically quarter derives from the 
French “quartier” meaning also the quartering and encampment of a body of troops, 
which in the case of a denial thereof, amounts to granting no protection, security, 
accommodation because the antecedent value, life, has not been spared379. 
 Originally the proscription of the deliberate tactic of leaving no survivors 
(deliberate in foresight, as in opposition to the accidental battlefield scenario in which 
hostilities are fought to the last man) was aimed at the commanders, the only ones 
entrusted with the competency of issuing such comprehensive behests, even if the order 
was not meant to be actually implemented, but only as psychological terror (threat of 
denial-of-quarter) driven against the inferiorly equipped party with the purview of 
accelerating withdrawal, rendition or capitulation380. However, the actual 
implementation of the order translated into attacking belligerents hors-de-combat 
(art.41API) is mentioned in tandem throughout this section in the ICRC/API-
Commentary. Equally, the ICRC/CLS clusters both together under the same rubric of 
“denial-of-quarter”(Chapter15: rules46-47). Thus, killing surrendering enemies carries 
similar unlawfulness as the superior order to wipe them out and it is tantamount to a 
grave breach, namely murder/assassination. Ordering that no quarter will be given 
represents multiple violations of attacking persons hors-de-combat381.  
 All things considered, the practice of targeting killing during an armed conflict 
stands very closely to a denial-of-quarter. It is in tension with IHL in at least four of its 
stages, which I would henceforth name the ontological, ethical, strategic and tactical 
incongruities.  
Firstly, a military engagement, the sole means of accomplishment requires a 
certain killing of the target(s), violates the nature (ontology) of war. Granted, the 
conduct of hostilities prompts the relaxation of situations in which it is permissible to 
kill/injure persons involved therein; putting in other words, that death becomes one of 
the normal/trivialized fallouts of any act-of-war. A right to participate in hostilities, 
nevertheless, does not entail a “license-to-kill” the enemy under any circumstances. The 
“St. Petersburg Declaration” set forth in the preamble that  
                                                          






“the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy(…) for this purpose it is 
sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men.”  
 
Accordingly, the weakening of the opposing troops will implicate undermining 
its conditions to further resist, usually by way of disabling soldiers. Able-bodied 
militaries will not often be rendered hors-de-combat, unless through grave injuries that 
likely result in their demise. In sum, killing the enemy is one of the commonplace forms 
of weakening the military forces, albeit slaying cannot be the goal in itself.  
Secondly, it is assumed in ethics, by the famous words of Rousseau (“Social 
Contract”), that war  
“is a relation -not between man and man: but between state and state; and 
individuals are enemies only accidentally: not as men, nor even as citizens: but as 
soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders”. 
 
 Inasmuch as not individuals as such are the enemies, but only to the extent that 
they act in defence of one of the warring parties, certain anonymity seems to be 
required. Hence, the singling out of one (unlawful)combatant contravenes the ethical 
compromise of not making the “enemy”, actually, an enemy. Statman responds to this 
critique of “named killing” through asserting that agents acting on behalf of one of the 
parties are not killed by who they are (“name”), but rather for the proficient role they 
play in hostilities382. This is especially true in counterterrorism during armed conflicts, 
in which the agents of the non-State party not only are not morally “blameless soldiers” 
only doing the bidding of polities383; the leaders, considering the military value in 
toppling them, are as well usually irreplaceable in the chain-of-command.  
Moreover, in level of the warlike strategy (planning), genuine targeted killings 
impinge criminal responsibility for war crimes to the senior officials that ordered them. 
A raid, such as the one in Abbottabad, should always leave the capture option (quarter) 
on the table; although, bearing in mind the military logic that is attached to the goal, it is 
more prone to end up in killing. Conversely, at the tactics (execution) of a mission 
under IHL, the combatants at the scene are obliged to grant quarter to an enemy at the 
point of surrender; otherwise, they commit a war crime too384.  Thus, an enemy gunned 






down, but not killed, rendered hors-de-combat through wounds, must not be “finished 
off”385. 
Obviously, considering the planning, the rule of thumb is that of 
reasonableness386. Melzer sets it rightly that commanders must not plan the operation 
making it virtually impossible to the adversary to offer surrender, though that does not 
mean surprise attacks of instant lethality or weapon-systems incapable of taking 
prisoners, such as explosives launched from an unmanned drone, are outlawed387. 
Bombing a place deemed to constitute a military objective, the destruction of which 
confers an advantage, implicates that those inside might not even be aware that they are 
being under attack; thus, the offer and acceptance of surrender are most of the time 
impracticable, but it does not make the operation illegal, since it was not based on an 
actual order of “no survivors” and no-one came around afterwards to “finish the job” if 
someone is “only” wounded under debris.  
On the other hand, feasibility of capture augments as soon as troops are on the 
ground, exactly the case of the Bin Laden operation, simply because human beings can 
make a full assessment of the situation and accord quarter to non-resisting individuals. 
There is, nonetheless, also a mitigation of the obligation to take prisoners. Mainly the 
position transpired by the US/UK Military Manuals is that the part “taking” surrender is 
not required to go out to receive surrender in the midst of battle388. The burden rather 
befalls the part “offering” surrender, requiring her to come forward, after having lain 
down arms and usually displaying signals such as holding hands up above the head or 
waving the white flag, in order to demonstrate that the offer is unconditional; only then, 
the obligation is absolute. One cannot reject unconditional surrender389. Therefore, last-
minute surrender as in the encounter of onrushing troops might be difficult to accept390.  
Anyway, it is uncontroversial that all persons, regardless of POW-status 
entitlement, benefit from the legal protection imposing grant of quarter391; cumulatively, 
that a commander cannot put to death prisoners merely because their presence retards 










the military maneuver or diminishes the power of resistance. In case he is not able to 
transport them, prisoners should be disarmed and released in safety392  
Neptune Spear, then, did not deny quarter to Osama Bin Laden. Ground-troops 
were preferred over dropping an explosive device from an offshore location. The 
planning included a possibility, albeit not likely, of capture. It was not a genuine 
targeted killing operation with sole purpose to kill: it aimed rather to neutralize and 
weaken Al-Qaida’s supreme leadership by disabling Bin Laden and destroying his 
capabilities to continue unlawfully engaging (continuously) in hostilities. The burden of 
demonstrating an unconditional offer of surrender fell on him, not the SEALs. He 
should have made it clear and feasible.  
In fact, nothing slightly suggested he ever housed any intention to giving himself 
in. If his resistance was arguably sufficient to justify killing him at “law-enforcement 
modus” that requires much more caution and imminent danger; “ad maiore ad minus”, 
his resistance was plainly compatible to ongoing hostilities. Resisting until the end is 
what everyone expected from Bin Laden. Accounts pointed he was retreating393 in the 
moment he went back inside his bedroom. Had he wanted to surrender, he should have 
come forward with his hands in the air, certainly not return to his hideout. The US 
position is unequivocal in this respect, an enemy combatant retreating is considered to 
be still engaging in hostilities394. Finally, Bin Laden belonged to a terrorist organization 
that openly flouted IHL rules, thus he never held good faith by waging hostilities in the 
way Al-Qaida has done, by attacking civilians and denying quarter, for instance. Even if 
he, at the last-minute, wanted to surrender in order to save his life, it is still hard to 
conceive that his offer, which could easily have been stained with perfidy to put the 
Special Commando off guard, then to use this leverage to violate confidence, would 
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Whereas it is permissible, but not entirely recommended, and utterly contradictory for 
failing to fulfill the custodial and higher societal values of accountability, to kill in order 
to arrest or prevent escape, 
 
Whereas it is permissible to kill a dangerous felon presenting actual and immediate 
threat to life/limb, equally on the verge of committing a violence offence, in defense of 
self and others, including the law-enforcement officials themselves, and that the conduct 
of Bin Laden probably subsumed this scenario, 
 
Whereas the deprivation of the right to life in the strictly proportional circumstances set 
above, and that no more life-threatening force is employed than necessary, is not 
considered arbitrary (extra-judicial execution); hence, not amounting to a violation of 
due-process rights, 
 
Whereas the terrorist group know as Al-Qaida has launched a campaign of armed 
attacks against US interests, allies and “soft targets”, acknowledged by the international 
community, and still has lingering intent and (weakened, but real) capability of keeping 
on the offensive, a right of national self-defence vests, 
 
Whereas there is nothing expressly and implicitly in the Charter of the United Nations 
interdicting defence of territorial integrity, political sovereignty and (arguably) nationals 
against non-state actors and that direct participants in armed attacks can be neutralized 
with necessary and proportional military force, 
 
Whereas the obligation to exact (criminal) jurisdiction lay with Pakistani authorities and 
they were either unable or unwilling for at least 5 years to live up to international duties, 
 
Whereas the US and coalition forces are engaged in a transnational armed conflict of 
non-international character in the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with Al-
Qaida and that cross-border operations into Pakistan -which is not a neutral/non-
belligerent party, rather a partner- intimately related to it are already a reality based on 




Whereas Osama Bin Laden satisfied the functional criteria of membership in an 
organized armed group with a continuous combat function, implying that he was liable 
to be made the object of attack at anytime, anywhere inside the theater-of-war, unless 
unequivocally disengaged, 
 
Whereas the Neptune Spear Operation complied with operational law principles of 
discrimination of military objectives, proportionality of civilian casualties and 
precautions in planning and execution, 
 
Whereas there was no resort to proscribed means or methods-of-warfare, particularly 
perfidy or denial-of-quarter, 
 
All foregoing arguments considered,  I am of the opinion that Neptune Spear Operation, 
carried out by JSOC-Special Forces, in Abbottabad, Pakistan (2nd,May,2011), and the 
death of Al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden that ensued as one of the main objectives 
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